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State of implementation of the Third Energy Package in the gas sector 
 
This report focuses on understanding how the EU gas markets are functioning. To do so, the report gives an 
overview of the gas market legislation, describes the existing gas markets / hubs in the member states and 
reviews the various metrics used in the literature to define well-functioning gas markets. 
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Executive summary 
The key objective of this report is to have an overview of both the EU legislation 
related to wholesale gas market and its implementation via the Network Codes, 
and the current state of the wholesale gas market progression towards an 
integrated market.  
Policy context 
An integrated EU energy market is the most cost-effective way to ensure secure 
and affordable supplies to EU citizens. Through common energy market rules and 
cross-border infrastructure, energy can be produced in one EU country and 
delivered to consumers in another. This keeps prices in check by creating 
competition and allowing consumers to choose energy suppliers. 
The Third Energy Package has been enacted to improve the functioning of the 
internal energy market and resolve structural problems. It covers five main 
areas: 
— unbundling energy suppliers from network operators 
— strengthening the independence of regulators 
— establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
— cross-border cooperation between transmission system operators and the 
creation of European Networks for Transmission System Operators 
— increased transparency in retail markets to benefit consumers. 
Energy is often bought and sold on wholesale markets before reaching the final 
consumer. To ensure the smooth functioning of these markets and prevent price 
manipulation, the EU has enacted regulations which prohibit the use of insider 
information or the spreading of incorrect information concerning supply, demand, 
and prices. 
The EU also passes rules on the use of cross-border energy networks. Known as 
network codes, these rules regulate who can use cross-border infrastructure and 
under what conditions. 
The EU has also established the Madrid Forum, which meets once or twice a year 
to discuss the creation of the internal gas market.  
In this policy context, the report makes a literature review concerning the 
wholesale gas market in different European areas and studies some of the 
Network Codes.  
Key conclusions 
Since the beginning of the process of energy market integration for gas, various 
research or European institutions have published metrics or criteria to assess the 
functioning of the wholesale gas markets. In this report we review those criteria 
and their application to the European gas markets / hubs. We also review the 
market definitions, actors, and geography.  
As the market integration is a process resulting from the EU legislation, and is 
based, among others, on cross-border cooperation and infrastructure use and 
development, we study in more details three of the Network Codes on gas. 
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Main findings 
From the review of the criteria assessing the functioning of the wholesale gas 
markets we found that by far, the most developed (also called mature or  
established) gas hubs are the National Balancing Point (NBP) in UK and the Title 
Transfer Facility (TTF) in NL. In 2016 TTF became the dominant European gas 
hub in terms of traded volumes and other criteria. There are also some active or 
advanced hubs that trade in particular in the spot and that are mostly balancing 
hubs. 
On another hand, the adoption of the Network Codes increases transparency, fair 
access to cross-border trade and flexibility for the supply leading to a more 
attractive environment for the markets participants. If they are in place in all the 
member states it is likely for the related hubs to develop. It is hence very 
important to understand their implementation. 
Related and future JRC work 
This is the first report in a series related to the gas market(s) in EU. In the 
future, the work will be continued by selecting data sources regarding gas 
demand and gas prices in the EU, and available models to analyse them, with 
possible description of links to other markets (electricity, oil or other regions). 
The monitoring of the state of implementation of the Third Energy Package will 
also be continued. 
Quick guide 
This report is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the analysis. Section 2 
gives an overview of the gas related EU legislation. Section 3 presents the EU 
gas markets, including the Gas Target Model, the metrics used by different actors 
to define a well-functioning market, the existing EU gas hubs and their scoring 
using the different metrics. Sections 4, 5 and 6 are dealing with the description 
of three Network Codes (Gas Balancing, Capacity Allocation Mechanism and 
Harmonized Transmission Tariffs). 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to provide the reader with a good understanding of 
the EU wholesale gas market. As energy markets are regulated, it is necessary to 
understand both the regulatory aspects and the market mechanisms. 
In this first report, we present an overview of the gas related EU energy law, 
followed by a description of the EU wholesale gas market, including the 
description of the Gas Target Model and other metrics for well-functioning 
markets, as well as a description of the EU gas hubs. 
Finally, we present three of the Network Codes (NCs) and their implementation. 
The three codes are the NC on Gas Balancing of Transmission Networks, the one 
on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems, and the one on 
Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for Gas.  
A NC is a set of common EU-wide rules in the form of an EU regulation 
established in accordance with the process in Article 6 of the Gas Regulation (1) 
for a given subject matter. NCs supplement the Gas Regulation and "amend… 
[its] non-essential elements". 
All NCs constitute and form integral parts of the Gas Regulation; its consistent 
and coherent implementation requires due consideration of the interactions 
between the Gas Regulation and any given NC, and between NCs.  
In the future, the work will be continued by selecting data sources regarding gas 
demand and gas prices in the EU, and available models to analyse them, with 
possible description of links to other markets (electricity, oil or other regions). 
                                           
(1)  Regulation (EC) No 715 / 2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775 / 2005 
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2 Overview of the EU energy law 
The European Union (EU) started with the European Coal and Steel Community 
(under the Paris Treaty) in 1951, created to prevent another world war. The 
European Coal and Steel Community was followed by the European Economic 
Community (under the Treaty of Rome) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (under the Euratom Treaty), both established in 1957. It is hence 
obvious that energy, from the very beginning, is considered a fundamental part 
of European integration.  
The primary legislation (i.e. the Treaties) was applicable to the energy sector, 
but as the topic was sensitive with regards to the national sovereignty, the 
member states (MS) did not initially transfer regulatory powers to the EU. Until 
the 1980s, national monopolies were not under the effect of the EU law. 
In the next decade (1980-1990), the opening of the national markets to 
competition started, as a result of the belief that competition would bring 
efficiency and benefits for the consumers in terms of prices and choice of 
suppliers. The transformation of the European energy markets, from state 
monopolies to markets governed by private companies, led to issuing a large 
number of regulations and directives. 
The goal of an integrated European gas market, enabling the free flow of energy 
throughout the EU through adequate infrastructure and without technical or 
regulatory barriers, is based on EU regulations that have been progressively 
introduced through different packages. 
Moreover, article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Lisbon, 2007) introduces a specific legal basis for the field of energy based on 
shared competences between the EU and its member countries. 
In Table 1 we present a timeline of the European legislation and strategies for 
the gas sector. 
Table 1. Main EU energy market legislation and strategies. 
First Energy Package 
1998 
Directive 1998/30/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas 
Second Energy 
Package 2003 
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas and 
repealing Directive 98/30/EC 
Third Energy Package 
2009 
Regulation (EC) 715/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for 
access to the natural gas transmission networks and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005  
Regulation 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for 
the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
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Directive 2003/55/EC  
Market integrity 
(REMIT) 2011 
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency 
(REMIT) 
Network codes 2014-
2017 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/703 establishing a 
Network Code on interoperability and data exchange 
rules 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 312/2014 
establishing a Network Code on Gas Balancing of 
Transmission Networks 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 establishing a 
network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in 
gas transmission systems and repealing Regulation 
(EU) No 984/2013 
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/715/EU amending 
Annex I to Regulation (EC) 715/2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks 
Guidance on best practices for congestion 
management procedures in natural gas transmission 
networks [SWD(2014) 250] 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 
2017 establishing a network code on harmonised 
transmission tariff structures for gas 
Energy Union strategy 
2015 
Purpose: making energy more secure, affordable and 
sustainable 
Dimensions: 
‒ security, solidarity and trust 
‒ fully integrated internal energy market 
‒ energy efficiency 
‒ decarbonising the economy 
‒ research, innovation and competitiveness in low-
carbon and clean energy  
Clean Energy Package 
2016 (proposal) 
Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union  
+ other proposals 
Security of supply 
2017 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 
concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas 
supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 
Source: own compilation on https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics  
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The first European Energy Directives provided for the liberalisation of energy 
markets and entered into force in 1998. Following that, several other pieces of 
energy market legislation were adopted, shifting from market liberalisation to 
energy market integration, and building the grounds for the Energy Union 
strategy. In 2003 and 2009, the second and third legislative packages 
respectively on the internal energy market entered into force. The third package 
introduced a clear separation of supply and production activities from network 
operation, a more effective regulatory oversight by independent national energy 
regulators, and a reinforcement of consumer protection. The goal was to open up 
the gas markets in the EU, to enhance investments in energy infrastructure and 
cross-border trade.  
The Third Energy Package also created the instruments to achieve the goals set 
out in the Gas Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 for a single energy market by 
developing European-wide network codes and guidelines which form a legally 
binding set of rules and obligations that govern access to and use of the 
European energy networks (cross-border capacity allocation mechanisms, rules 
on balancing, rules on transmission tariffs structures and rules on operability). 
The Third Energy Package initiated the creation of the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), as an association between 
gas transmission system operators (TSOs). 
Moreover, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) was 
created by the third energy package as an independent European agency with 
the mission to have a central role in the development of EU-wide network and 
market rules for enhancing competition. It assists national energy regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) in performing their duties, coordinates regional and cross-
regional initiatives which enhance market integration, monitors the work of the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) and evaluates 
their network development plans. ACER can issue both non-binding opinions and 
recommendations to national energy regulators, TSOs and the EU institutions as 
well as binding decisions in specific cases and on cross-broder issues.  
The legislation related to the Third Package is overseen / implemented by Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER), ACER, and the ENTSOs. 
The Third Energy Package also provides for issues related to vulnerable 
consumers (energy poverty), consumers' rights (switch energy providers, receive 
clear offers, contracts and energy bills), obligations on suppliers with regards to 
the contents of supply contracts etc.  
In addition, more specific EU regulations exist, for example Regulation (EU) No 
1227/2011 (REMIT) which introduced a sector-specific legal framework to 
identify and penalise insider trading and market manipulation in European 
wholesale markets. 
Significant steps have been made towards the establishment of the internal 
energy market and the other objectives included in the Energy Union strategy 
(2015). However, the Commission has concluded that further efforts are still 
required. To support this, the Commission has agreed to monitor each year the 
progress made towards building the Energy Union. This State of the Energy 
Union was published for the first time on 18 November 2015 and brought 
together a series of Commission reports and initiatives. It also includes a report 
monitoring the progress towards the Energy Union objectives for each MS 
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separately. The second and the third reports on the State of the Energy Union 
were published in February and in November 2017.  
As energy in the EU is regulated at national level, the aim of the Energy Union is 
to transform the EU’s energy system that currently comprises 28 national 
frameworks into one EU-wide framework. 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and 
repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 aims to prevent gas supply crises and: 
— requires that ENTSOG performs an EU-wide gas supply and infrastructure 
disruption simulation to provide a high level overview of the major supply 
risks for the EU 
— requires EU countries to cooperate with each other in regional groups to 
assess common supply risks together (e.g. draft common Risk Assessments) 
and to develop and agree on joint preventive and emergency measures (to be 
reflected in their Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans) 
— introduces the solidarity principle where EU countries must help each other to 
always guarantee gas supply to the most vulnerable consumers, even in 
severe gas crisis situations 
— improves transparency: natural gas companies must officially notify to their 
national authority their major long-term supply contracts that may be 
relevant to security of supply (e.g. if the contract exceeds 28 % of the annual 
gas consumption in the MS)  
— ensures that decisions on whether pipelines should have permanent bi-
directional capacity (reverse flow) and to take into consideration the views of 
all EU countries that could potentially benefit. 
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3 The EU gas market 
3.1 The Gas Target Model 
In EU Regulation 715/2009 it is stated that: "To enhance competition through 
liquid wholesale markets for gas, it is vital that gas can be traded independently 
of its location in the system. The only way to do this is to give network users the 
freedom to book entry and exit capacity independently, thereby creating gas 
transport through zones instead of along contractual paths." 
Part of the agenda of the Third Package was to create a set of EU-wide NCs to 
facilitate cross-border gas transactions. TSOs should operate their network in 
accordance with those NCs. These NCs have to be in line with a set of non-
binding Framework Guidelines and binding Guidelines on specific subjects 
developed by respectively ACER and the European Commission. In order to 
ensure that the Framework Guidelines do not conflict, a Target Model was 
developed. The 18th Madrid Forum (2) invited "the Commission and the 
regulators to explore, in close cooperation with system operators and other 
stakeholders, the interaction and interdependence of all relevant areas for 
network codes and to initiate a process establishing a gas target model".  
CEER proposed a hub trading framework, namely the European Gas Target Model 
(GTM), which was endorsed by the 21st Madrid Forum in March 2012 to foster 
gas-on-gas competition and share its benefits across the MS.  
The main principles of this first GTM are described below. 
The European gas market will consist of interconnected entry-exit zones with 
virtual hubs. Entry-exit zones should allow shippers to trade gas freely within 
each entry-exit zone, such that internal physical congestion does not unduly 
restrict gas trading. Achieving the single gas market requires sufficient 
interconnection between markets; therefore the regulatory regime should signal 
where investment is needed and provide TSOs with a predictable framework for 
recovering sufficient revenues to cover costs. Once built, interconnection 
capacity needs to be easily accessible to shippers on a non-discriminatory basis 
and at a transparent and fair price. The capacity offered to the market needs to 
be maximised and contractual congestion should be mitigated, in order to deter 
capacity hoarding. Shippers need both long-term and short term capacity as gas 
may be traded both long and short term. Sufficient and accessible 
interconnection will promote liquidity in hub-based trading, which in turn will 
assist with the development of market-based balancing. 
In January 2015, ACER renewed and updated the GTM while maintaining the core 
principles. The revised GTM guides the coherent development and 
implementation of the NCs and specifies the steps required to realise liquid and 
dynamic gas markets. It is denoted AGTM.  
Several reasons were at the origin of revising the GTM, and one of them was the 
change in the dynamics of supply/demand. Concerning the demand side, the 
shale gas revolution in USA had a large impact in the sense that it put gas-
intensive European industrial enterprises at a competitive disadvantage and it 
allowed for coal-fired generation to become more profitable than gas-fired power 
stations (because coal was available at lower prices due to its displacement from 
                                           
(2)  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/madrid-forum-previous-meetings 
 10 
the American power mix, and the carbon price was low). Concerning the supply 
side, the European gas production declined. 
The model encouraged a self-assessment by the NRAs of the functioning of the 
national markets. Furthermore, this model recommended measures to overcome 
situations where the national sectors were not favourable to competition and 
market liquidity.  
Overall, AGTM envisaged the amount of infrastructure that, if utilised efficiently, 
would enable gas to move freely across market areas towards where it is priced 
highest. In addition, AGTM defined measures for the harmonisation of the 
balancing system across MS, and mechanisms to enhance wholesale natural gas 
market quality, namely the level of trading activity, liquidity, resilience, volatility 
and competitiveness, to better sustain hedging and price risk management.  
The AGTM includes an assessment of the functioning of wholesale markets at 
national level, developing a revised series of metrics to assess whether a 
wholesale market is "well-functioning". These metrics are based on the analysis 
of data and information that were not available when the first GTM was drafted 
and can be grouped into two key characteristics of markets:  
1. They meet market participants’ needs: products and liquidity are available 
that enable effective management of wholesale market risk; and, 
2. They have market health: the wholesale market is demonstrably competitive, 
resilient and has a high degree of security of supply.  
The AGTM proposes that all MS assess those metrics by 2017 (and every three 
years thereafter) in order to determine whether their market will be well 
functioning. If the market does not function properly, the AGTM suggests 
considering structural market reforms.  
The market integration tools are (3): 
1. Full market merger: full merger of two or more adjacent markets by merging 
their virtual trading points and balancing zones;  
2. Trading region: partial merger of two or more adjacent markets at the 
wholesale level by merging their virtual trading points and establishing a 
cross-border trading balancing zone; and,  
3. Satellite market: substantial linking (via pipeline capacity) of a non-
functioning gas market to a directly neighbouring, well-functioning wholesale 
gas market. 
3.2 Markets  
 Regulators and operators 3.2.1
Theoretically, gas can flow freely through the grids in Europe. In a single 
European energy market, all producers and suppliers are competing with one 
another. It should be possible to buy and sell gas wherever one wants, to obtain 
energy at the most competitive price. However, the development of cross-border 
energy businesses is still under the governance of national rules. An example 
may be that some players may have an unfair privileged access to energy grids 
                                           
(3)  Presentation of ACER Gas Target Model - Annex 6 (https://www.acer.europa.eu/Events/Presentation-of-
ACER-Gas-Target-Model-/default.aspx) 
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and the prices are set by governments. Investors might not be willing to invest 
because the outlook does not look very promising. Competition needed to be 
managed in a better way. Common rules on the equitable use of grids were 
introduced. The EU has an extremely important role to play here as, if it sets the 
rules, it also has extensive powers to supervise markets to prevent certain 
players from unjustly exploiting any kind of monopoly. 
NRAs have a key role to play in ensuring that each European country meets its 
targets for energy markets and implement all EU regulatory policy. They act in 
the interest of the consumers. They can impose sanctions on operators that fail 
to comply with the requirements of the regulatory framework or do not 
implement its decisions. 
A TSO is a regulated player in charge of the whole network operation. 
There is only one NRA in a country, but there might be several TSOs, as for 
instance in Germany, where there are 16. 
Table 2. List of regulators and gas transmission operators in the EU 
Country NRA TSO 
Austria E-control (Energie-Control 
Austria) 
Gas Connect Austria GmbH 
TAG GmbH 
(Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH) 
Belgium CREG (Commission pour la 
Régulation de l’Electricité et 
du Gaz) 
Fluxys Belgium SA/NV 
Bulgaria EWRC (Energy & Water 
Regulatory Commission) 
Bulgartransgaz EAD 
Croatia HERA (Croatian energy 
regulatory agency) 
Plinacro Ltd 
Cyprus CERA (Cyprus Energy 
Regulatory Authority) 
 
Czech 
Republic 
ERO (Energy Regulatory 
Office) 
NET4GAS, s.r.o. 
Denmark DERA (Danish Energy 
Regulatory Authority) 
Energinet 
Estonia ECA (Estonian Competition 
Authority – Energy 
Regulatory Dept) 
Elering AS 
Finland EV (Energiavirasto – The 
Energy Authority) 
Gasum Oy (Gasum Corporation) 
France CRE (Commission de GRTgaz 
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Régulation de l’Energie) TIGF SA (Transport et 
Infrastructures Gaz France) 
Germany BNetzA (Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Posts 
and Railway - 
Bundesnetzagentur) 
bayernets GmbH 
Fluxys Deutschland GmbH 
Fluxys Tenp GmbH 
GASCADE Gastransport GmbH 
Gastransport Nord GmbH 
Gasunie Deutschland Transport 
Services GmbH 
GRTgaz Deutschland GmbH  
jordgasTransport GmbH 
Lubmin-BrandovGastransport 
GmbH 
NEL Gastransport GmbH 
Nowega GmbH 
ONTRANS Gastransport GmbH 
OPAL Gastransport GmbH & Co. 
KG 
Open Grid Europe GmbH  
terranets bw GmbH 
Thyssengas GmbH 
Greece PAE / RAE (Regulatory 
Authority for Energy) 
DESFA S.A. (Hellenic Gas 
Transmision System Operator 
S.A.) 
Hungary MEKH (Hungarian Energy 
and Public Utility Regulatory 
Authority) 
FGSZ Natural Gas Transmission  
Ireland CER (Commission for 
Energy Regulation) 
Gas Networks Ireland 
Italy AEEGSI (Autorita per 
l’energia elettrica il gas ed il 
sistema idrico) 
Infrastrutture Trasporto Gas SpA 
Snam Rete Gas S.p.A. 
Latvia PUC (Public Utilities 
Commission) 
Conexus Baltic Grid 
Lithuania NCC (Valstybinė kainų ir 
energetikos kontrolės 
komisija / National Control 
Commission for Prices and 
AB Amber Grid 
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Energy) 
Luxemburg ILR (Institut 
Luxembourgeois de 
Régulation) 
Creos Luxembourg S.A. 
Malta REWS (Regulator for Energy 
and Water Services) 
 
Netherlands ACM (Authority for 
Consumers and Markets) 
Gasunie Transport Services B.V. 
(GTS) 
BBL Company V.O.F. 
Poland URE / ERO (The Energy 
Regulatory Office of Poland) 
Gas Transmission Operator 
GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. 
Portugal ERSE (Energy Services 
Regulatory Authority) 
REN - Gasodutos, S.A. 
Romania ANRE (Romanian Energy 
Regulatory Authority) 
SNTGN Transgaz S.A. 
Slovakia URSO (Regulatory Office for 
Network Industries) 
eustream, a.s. 
Slovenia AGEN (Energy Agency) PLINOVODI d.o.o.   
Spain CNMC (National Commission 
for Markets and 
Competition) 
ENAGAS TRANSPORTE S.A.U 
Sweden EI 
(Energimarknadsinpektionen 
/ Energy Markets 
Inspectorate) 
Swedegas AB 
United 
Kingdom 
Ofgem (Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets) 
GNI(UK) 
Interconnector (UK) Limited 
National Grid Gas plc 
Premier Transmission Limited 
Source: own compilation on  https://eeueuropa.eu/national-regulatory-authorities-energy-europe/ and 
https://www.entsog.eu/members  
 Market definition, contracts, terminology  3.2.2
3.2.2.1 Market definition 
The approach followed here is the one from four publications of P. Heather 
(Heather 2010; Heather 2012; Heather 2015 and Heather and Petrovich 2017). 
For a liberalised wholesale market to be developed it is necessary that the 
industrial, commercial, and residential sectors are fully liberalised. This creates 
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competition between suppliers on one hand and demand for competitive pricing 
on the other. 
There are three main reasons for a company to trade: to buy or to sell gas for 
balancing a physical portfolio, to make financial hedging, and to speculate.  
The first is the most obvious: a company sells to other companies or to end-
consumers. The volume will depend on the consumption, production, price and 
sales forecasts. As the delivery date will approach, several layers of trading will 
be done to adjust the actual quantities to be delivered.  
The reasons for trading determine which "route to market" (Heather 2015) to 
follow.  
Figure 1. The routes to the market 
 
Source: (Heather 2015) 
3.2.2.2 Contracts and methods of trading  
There are roughly three types of contracts: negotiated, over-the-counter (OTC), 
and exchange. 
The negotiated contracts are individually negotiated on non-standard terms. 
Every aspect of this contract is negotiated in general over many months for the 
long term contacts with large quantities to be delivered. 
The over-the-counter (OTC) market is a bilateral market where deals are done 
directly between two traders. The trades are conducted in a standardised way in 
one, or several, clearly defined time periods. This leads to easy trading, greater 
transparency, and liquidity. In a bilateral trading relationship only the two parties 
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know about the exact terms and conditions of the trading deal. For example the 
price is not published and cannot be seen by other market participants. This 
market is not regulated and therefore there is counterparty credit and 
performance risk which needs to be mitigated. On an OTC market, products are 
traded with similar delivery times to products traded on an exchange. 
The exchange is an institutionalised marketplace. It is governed by the relevant 
financial regulator in each country. The products are standardised, meaning that 
the contracts are uniform in regard to their structure and form. Due date, place 
of delivery and the conditions for clearing and settlement are standardised. The 
set of rules such as the conditions to be admitted to trade on the exchange are 
made public and are the same for every market participant. Prices and revenues 
are also made public. Trading partners don’t have to be found and the clearing 
house financially guarantees all of the trades executed. Since the trading process 
is anonymous, market participants can keep their strategy a secret. Exchange 
trading gas is becoming more popular since 2008, but the market penetration 
varies from country to country. The European exchanges that offer gas contracts 
are: ICE, ICE-Endex, EEX, Powernext, CEGH, and GME. The most important one 
is ICE (4).  
The methods of trading are either direct of via brokers, voice or electronic, but 
most of the trades are made via brokers. The brokers have their own trading 
platforms.  
The length of time forward that it is possible to trade is called the "curve". The 
traded curve covers the: 
— Spot curve (today or tomorrow) 
— Prompt curve (all other periods within the month or the next month) 
— The near curve (the first two season; there are two 6 months seasons: winter 
and summer, starting 1st October and 1st April respectively) 
— The mid curve (two years forward) 
— The far curve (everything beyond that, usually 5 years forward) 
The spot and prompt contracts cover days or group of days such as Within Day 
(WD), Day Ahead (DA), Balance of Week (BOW), Weekend (WE), Balance of 
Month (BOM), and the Month Ahead (MA). The curve trades in months, quarters, 
seasons and years. 
The reason for trading in the spot and prompt contracts is to physically optimise 
or balance a portfolio at, or just ahead of delivery. Most trading activity takes 
place in the prompt and near curve, and the most popular contracts are WD, DA, 
MA, and the front two seasons. Roughly, 70-80 % of the volume is traded in the 
spot, prompt, and near curve.  
3.2.2.3 Terminology  
Other terminologies used for the gas in the gas market are: 
— Traded gas: gas bought and sold at the hubs, for physical delivery, for 
financial hedging or for speculation. It is usually a standard product on OTC or 
exchange market, mostly for spot, prompt or near mid curve maturity.  
                                           
(4)  https://www.theice.com/energy/natural-gas-futures 
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— Contracted gas: gas traded or contracted bilaterally for delivery at a hub and 
can be a standard product or bespoke, of any time duration (often medium to 
long term). It includes the traditional Continental European long term 
contracts (LTCs) as well as the British contracts. They are concluded either 
directly between the buyer and the seller or on the OTC market. The typical 
duration is of 20-30 years for the Continental European LTCs and of 8-12 
years for the British ones. 
— Exchanged gas: gas that is physically nominated and delivered at, or taken 
from, a hub. It is the physical part of gas contracts. 
3.3 Metrics for well-functioning markets  
 The AGTM metrics 3.3.1
ACER's 2014 Gas Target Model metrics are presented below. 
Table 3. ACER's 2014 Gas Target Model metrics 
Metric  Threshold 
Market participants’ 
need 
Day-ahead 
Product 
Front Month 
product 
Forward 
Pre-transactional liquidity 
1 Order book volumes ≥ 2,000 MW on 
each bid-and 
offer-side 
≥ 470 MW on 
each bid-and 
offer-side 
≥ 120 MW on 
each bid-and 
offer-side 
for 17 months 
ahead 
2 Bid-offer spread ≤ 0.4% of bid-
price 
≤ 0.2% of bid-
price 
≤ 0.7% of bid-
price 
for 24 months 
ahead 
3 Order book price 
sensitivity 
≤ 0.02% price 
distance 
between 
average price 
for 
120 MW and 
best price on 
each bid- and 
offer-side 
≤ 0.1% price 
distance 
between 
average price 
for 120 MW and 
best price on 
each bid- and 
offer-side 
≤ 0.2% price 
distance 
between 
average price 
for 
120 MW and 
best price on 
each bid- and 
offer-side for 
24 months 
ahead 
Transactional liquidity 
4 Number of trades ≥ 420 trades 
per day 
≥ 160 trades 
per day 
≥ 8 trades per 
day for 22 
months ahead 
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Market health  Spot, prompt and forward market together 
5 Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index 
≤ 2000 
6 Number of supply 
sources 
≥ 3 
7 Residual Supply Index ≥ 110% 
8 Market concentration 
for bid & offer activities 
≤ 40% market share per company (or group of 
companies) for the best 120 MW on each bid- and 
offer-side 
9 Market concentration 
for trading activities 
≤ 40% market share per company (or group of 
companies) for the sale and purchase of gas each 
Source: ACER(5)  
The metrics are defined here below. 
1. Order book volume. Sufficient bid and offer volumes in the order book which 
deliver gas reasonably far into the future allow market participants to buy and 
sell gas when they need it and support effective risk management.  
2. Bid-offer spread. Low bid-offer spreads mean low transaction costs for market 
participants and support market participants who have less flexibility with 
respect to when they can trade (as a percentage).  
3. Order book price sensitivity. Low order book price sensitivity means less 
additional cost for market participants when buying or selling substantial 
volumes and supports market participants who have less flexibility with 
respect to when they can trade (as a percentage).  
4. Number of trades. Sufficient trading activities support market participants’ 
confidence that prices are transparent and represent a reliable market price.  
5. Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a 
measure of the level of concentration in a market and is often used by 
competition authorities when investigating mergers or acquisitions. It ranges 
from 10000/N to 10000, where N is the number of firms in the market and 
when the shares of the firms are expressed in percents. A higher HHI implies 
a higher concentration, i.e. fewer suppliers or a greater market share 
accounted for by a few suppliers. 
6. Number of supply sources. The number of supply sources from which a 
Member State procures gas is a first indicator for the level of concentration in 
upstream supply to that country. Three or more supply sources per country 
are considered the minimum to achieve a reasonable diversification of 
supplies.  
7. Residual Supply Index. The Residual Supply Index (RSI) measures the 
reliance of a market on its largest supplier. The supply capability of all but the 
largest supplier should amount to 110 % of demand.  
8. Market concentration for bid & offer activities. This metric measures the 
market share per company or group of companies based on the bid and offer 
                                           
(5)  Presentation of ACER Gas Target Model - Annex 3 (https://www.acer.europa.eu/Events/Presentation-of-
ACER-Gas-Target-Model-/default.aspx) 
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order volumes placed. Lower market shares support a higher level of 
competition. 
9. Market concentration for trading activities. This metric measures the market 
share per company or group of companies based on the traded volumes. 
Lower market shares support a higher level of competition.  
As the metrics are used by every MS for the self-assessment, precise details with 
regards to the definitions and calculations are given in (5). 
 The OIES (P. Heather) metrics  3.3.2
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) performs thorough analyses of 
the European gas traded hubs (Heather 2010; Heather 2012; Heather 2015, and 
Heather and Petrovich 2017). 
The hubs are assessed based on their maturity and development, from a liquidity 
and price perspective, in order to see the state of achievement of the "Single 
Energy Market" for natural gas. The assessment is made by using a certain 
number of metrics for liquidity and for prices. A ranking of the European gas 
hubs is also proposed based on those metrics. 
The metrics have been built taking into account three areas of concern: 
— Liquidity and data transparency. There is a lack of common methodology with 
regards to the available data and its timeline. It is easy, for instance to know 
the physical flow volumes on a near real-time basis in UK and NL while it is 
more difficult and with a greater delay to know them for FR, BE, and DE.  
— Physical connectivity. The infrastructure should be such as to allow better 
physical transportation of gas and prevent price distortion. Each single 
entry/exit market area has to be balanced every day, and therefore the 
infrastructure should be flexible enough to permit that. The removal of the 
bottlenecks in the infrastructure is costly (estimated at €200 bn (6)) and it is 
not immediate. Some of the needed projects may not even obtain financial 
approval due to poor cost/benefit analysis (CBA). This is the main reason, for 
instance, for keeping two German market areas instead of merging them. One 
way to circle the problem is to couple only the financial part (also called 
"market coupling"). An example of market coupling has been done between 
the Dutch grid and the Gaspool German grid, where the coupling was offered 
and managed by the Dutch TSO GTS (Gasunie Transport Services) and the 
German TSO Gasunie Deutschland. 
— Political willingness and cultural attitudes. The governments in UK and NL had 
a political willingness to have liberalised markets and to ensure this, they 
passed the necessary laws. As a consequence, such markets exist in those 
two countries. Later on, the Austrian government pushed for reform of the 
network and for changes in commercial practices and the new VPT hub is on 
the right track with regards to the liquidity. 
Other EU MS have passed laws derived from the Energy Packages, but few 
have ensured their effective implementation.  
                                           
(6) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure  
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On the "cultural" side, it should be noted that there are very different 
attitudes across Europe with regards to the liberalisation of energy markets 
and to trading. 
Table 4. Metrics of P. Heather 
Liquidity metrics Description   
1 Market participants 
The number of active participants (good indicator for 
the degree of development of the hub) 
2 Traded products 
Type of traded products (good indicator to assess if the 
traded market is used for balancing or for risk 
management) 
3 Traded volumes 
Quantity of traded products (good indicator for the 
market activity and development; sign of a hub's 
relative importance) 
4 Tradability index ICIS index for liquidity 
5 Churn rates 
Ratio between the traded volume and actual physical 
throughput (most important of the liquidity metrics; 
measure of a gas hub's commercial success) 
Price metrics Description 
6 Price signals 
Frequency of the price signals for traded gas (frequent 
- i.e. daily - price signals are a prerequisite for a well-
functioning traded commodity market as they provide 
transparency and an efficient allocation of the 
commodity across different locations and market 
participants) 
7 
Price convergence 
between OTC and 
exchange 
They should not be significantly different 
8 
Price correlation 
score between 
adjacent markets 
Assess the efficiency of cross-broder trading and the 
degree of integration between hubs 
9 Price volatility 
It is expected for the adjacent hubs' prices to move in 
the same direction, for both high and low volatilities. 
It is the most representative metric of market risks: 
different volatilities between the prices in two hubs 
indicates that it is not wise to use one hub to financially 
hedge a physical position in the other  
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Subjective indicators Description 
10 Political will 
Expected implementation date of the Balancing 
Network Code (BAL NC)  
11 Cultural attitudes 
Historical attitude of nations to trading, which make 
Europe-wide implementation of standardised trading 
rules very difficult (also difficult to pin down) 
12 
Level of 
commercial 
acceptance 
Change in the historical gas contracts in Europe. Role 
of the regulatory authorities and the TSOs in making 
the change  
Source: adapted from (Heather and Petrovich 2017) 
A classification of the gas hubs as mature, active, poor and inactive based on a 
simple scoring methodology applied to the five liquidity metrics is extensively 
used. 
The subjective indicators are not really evaluated except maybe for the political 
will, but a proxy is considered instead. The proxy is the score proposed by the 
European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET). The use of this proxy is quite 
straightforward, as the EFET scores are divided in categories for which different 
bodies are responsible: NRAs, TSOs and the market, as we will see in the next 
section. 
 The EFET metrics  3.3.3
Table 5. EFET metrics 
Description  Scoring method  
Regulatory (NRA) conditions   
1 Establish a consultation mechanism 1 if group set up and English language 
2 Resolve market structural issues 
(defined role for historical player: 
gas release programs, transport 
capacity release programs, market 
maker obligations, etc.) 
½ for release etc.; 1 if market maker 
3 Defined Role of Hub operator (what 
are its responsibilities in comparison 
with the TSO) 
1 if role defined; 2 if governance 
addressed 
4 Agree regulatory jurisdiction if 
cross-broder 
0 if cross-broder and no agreement; 1 
if not cross-broder or does have 
agreement 
5 Establishment of exchange 1 if exchange appointed and hub is 
liquid; ½ if exchange appointed and 
hub illiquid 
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TSO conditions 
6 Entry-exit system established 1 for Entry Exit with a single VTP 
7 Title Transfer (gas can be traded 
without physical delivery, usually by 
transfer between balancing groups) 
 
8 Cashout rules (long short positions set 
to zero at the end of the balancing 
period against payment of penalty in 
€/MWh) 
 
9 Accessible to non-physical traders (to 
trade gas you do not require to flow 
gas physically from entry to exit) 
 1 if trade without signup to 
physical rules 
10 Firmness of hub (cash out rules 
instead of pro rata curtailment of flows 
in case not enough gas is traded at 
the hub) 
0 if not firm; ½ if firmness 
"managed" by TSO; 1 if Back-up-
Back-down; 2 if fully market-based 
11 Credit arrangements non-punitive  
Market conditions 
12 Establish a reference price at the hub 
for contract settlement 
1 if price always available; ½ if 
deemed 
13 Standardised contract (e.g. EFET 
Master Contract) 
1 if specialised contract – EFET or 
equivalent (or standard is 
sufficient) 
14 Price Reporting Agencies active at the 
hub 
2 if several, 1 if only one PRA 
15 Market makers 1/2 if only 1 or 2; 1 if several or 
not necessary any more 
16 Brokers ½ if voice or few ; 1 if systems and 
many 
17 Index becomes reliable and used as 
benchmark 
1 if market parties frequently 
requested 
Source: adapted from (EFET 2017) 
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3.4 The European gas hubs 
 The gas geography 3.4.1
The geographical areas in relation to gas markets/hubs are defined differently by 
institutions such as ENTSOG and International Gas Union (IGU), as well as in the 
OIES papers or gas Regulations.  
Concerning ENTSOG, there is a legal requirement to promote regional 
cooperation (EU Directive 2009/73/EC and EU Gas Regulation (EC) 715/2009), 
following which the TSOs are publishing the Gas Regional Investment Plans 
(GRIPs) on a biennial basis. 
Based on an analysis of transmission system interconnections and operation, as 
well as infrastructure development needs, the ENTSOG TSOs agreed on six 
regional groupings, in some cases overlapping, to develop the first GRIPs. The 
groupings are: 
— GRIP North-West (9 countries): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK 
— GRIP South (3 countries): France, Portugal, Spain 
— GRIP CEE (10 countries): Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
— GRIP BEMIP (7 countries): Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Sweden 
— GRIP Southern Corridor (9 countries): Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia  
— GRIP South-North Corridor (6 six countries): Italy, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland  
Figure 2. Map of the ENTSOG/GRIP regions North West and Central Eastern Europe 
 
Source: own elaboration on ENTSOG/GRIP 
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Figure 3. Map of the ENTSOG/GRIP regions North West and Central Eastern Europe 
 
Source: own elaboration on ENTSOG/GRIP 
Figure 4. Map of the ENTSOG/GRIP regions BEMIP and South 
 
Source: own elaboration on ENTSOG/GRIP 
IGU uses the following (non-overlapping) classification, which includes more 
countries than the MS: 
— North-west Europe: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 
— Central Europe: Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Switzerland 
— Mediterranean: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey 
— South-east: Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia 
— Scandinavia and Baltics: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden 
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Figure 5. Map of the IGU regions 
 
Source: own elaboration on IGU data 
Heather (2015) uses another classification, based on the level of development of 
the gas hubs and on the evolution in price formation (from oil indexation to 
market pricing). Within each area different levels may coexist. 
— North-West Europe (NEW): Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
UK 
— Central European (CE): Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
— South-East Europe (SEE): Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, 
Turkey, and all the resting countries from the Balkans 
— Iberian Peninsula (SWE): Portugal, Spain 
— Southern Europe (SE): Italy 
— Northern Europe (NE): Denmark, Sweden 
— North-East Europe (NEE): Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania 
— Central Eastern Europe (CEE): Ukraine (not represented on the map). 
Figure 6. Map of P. Heather regions 
 
Source: own elaboration on (Heather and Petrovich 2017) 
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Finally, the Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the security of gas supply provides for 
risk assessment and preventive action and emergency plans at regional level. 
The regions for their preparation are represented here below. 
Figure 7. Map of the regions in the security of gas supply Regulation 2017/1938 
 
Source: own elaboration on DG Energy data 
 The European natural gas hubs  3.4.2
Gas market liberalization has been implemented using different mechanisms for 
allocating network services. In the EU, the mechanism is called entry/exit 
allocation, or virtual hub, and was designed to reduce the need for explicit 
negotiation of network services. 
It is based on the implementation by a TSO, and characterised by a combination 
of explicit and implicit allocation of gas transmission services. The idea behind it 
is to simplify the network topology to a simpler set of entry and exit points (a 
"commercial" network that represent partially the physical network). All explicit 
allocation is reduced to buying separately entry and exit rights. After that, 
shippers do not need to buy additional transmission rights (such as flexibility 
rights) but they are allocated implicitly by TSOs (according to a set of rules 
defined by the regulator). With it, one avoids the explicit allocation and 
renegotiation of complex spatial and temporal characteristics of the network, but 
the counterpart is that it is difficult to compute the capacity to be sold. 
The liberalisation of natural gas prices and increasing flexibility in the gas market 
means that market centres and hubs are continuously being developed. A gas 
hub is a virtual or physical location within the grid where the exchange of gas 
volumes takes place; it is a gas market where the commodity is traded on a 
standardised basis between market participants.  
The higher levels of trading at gas hubs will lead to the development of gas spot 
markets and then to the development of financial gas markets. Financial gas 
trading means that non-gas players, such as banks, institutional investors and 
pure trading firms, can enter the market and take on gas-specific risks. Financial 
gas contracts are used to manage two types of risk in the natural gas market: 
price and basis risk. Price risk is generated by the volatile spot market prices of 
natural gas. Basis risk is the risk of change in the price differential between 
locations, time periods, and qualities of natural gas deliveries, and between 
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natural gas and other commodities. Transparency and liquidity are the 
fundamentals for success for a natural gas trading hub. 
All the European natural gas hubs are balancing hubs. This means that they are 
used by Shippers to balance their portfolios near to maturity and at delivery and 
by the TSO to physically balance the gas grid (in general daily). If the hubs are 
used by shippers to risk manage their portfolio then they are also trading hubs.  
Therefore, trading at balancing hubs mainly involves spot/prompt markets. Spot 
prices are set according to the prevailing conditions of supply and demand. 
Published spot price indices are available for natural gas at different hubs from 
different providers (e.g. from ICIS, Platts), as well as listed across European 
energy exchanges (e.g. Powernext at the PEG Nord hub, ENDEX at the TTF hub, 
EEX at the NCG and GasPool hubs). Nevertheless, hubs are increasingly used as 
financial hubs to hedge risk and manage portfolios through derivative 
instruments.  
The most mature and successful hubs in EU are both balancing and trading ones. 
Heather (Heather 2015) defines the concept of maturity and requirements for 
success.  
The maturity of a hub is achieved through a 10-15 years process. The steps to 
the maturity are: 
— Third Party Access (TPA) to the infrastructure (it requires legislative changes 
to force the incumbents to release infrastructure capacity and gas supply 
volumes; it gives incentives to independent companies to enter the market) 
— Bilateral trading  
— Price discovery and disclosure  
— Balancing rules and regulations for the physical market and standardised 
trading contracts for the commercial part 
— OTC brokered trading 
— Entry of non-physical players 
— Creation of exchange products (futures) based on the underlying physical 
contracts 
— Development of the forward curve (used for risk management) 
— Use the specific traded products (DA or MA) as indices on which traders price 
the physical transactions (possible if there is enough liquidity). 
The requirements for a successful hub are: 
— Liquidity, defined as: 
 The ability to quickly buy or sell a commodity without a significant change in 
its price and without incurring significant transaction costs. 
 A liquid market is a place where standard transactions can be executed 
quickly and where a large transaction volume has only marginal price.  
— Volatility, defined as a measure of price movement in relation to market 
activity (energy markets are typically very volatile)  
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 Historical volatility is a statistical measurement (dispersion) based on a 
dataset of realised historical price return observations over a specified time 
period. 
 Implied volatility is the level of volatility expected by the market from the 
prices of traded gas options (it is calculated using the option pricing formula, 
for instance Black Scholes) 
— Anonymity: the Clearing House is the counterparty to all trades, allowing big 
and small participants to trade alongside each other. 
— Transparency: traded volumes and prices are disseminated to the public in an 
accurate, reliable and timely manner 
— Traded volumes: total actual volume traded in a market 
The main participants in a hub may be classified into the following categories: 
banks and funds, producers, end users, proprietary traders, other European 
players, OTC brokers, the TSO (which will trade in order to balance the network), 
institutional investors, private investors, commodity traders.  
The EU gas hubs are listed below. 
The National Balancing Point (NBP) in the UK started trading in 1996 and 
represents the most mature hub in Europe. The NBP is a notional point (the 
whole National Transmission System) created by a network code in UK in order 
to promote its balancing mechanism, where shippers nominate their buy and sell 
trades and where the TSO can balance the system on a daily basis. NBP rapidly 
evolved as a trading point. 
The prices at the NBP hub serve as a benchmark for almost all traded gas in the 
UK. The NBP is connected to Continental Europe by the Interconnector (BE) and 
the Balgzand Bacton Line (NL).  
The Title Transfer Facility (TTF), in the Netherlands, started trading in 2003, but 
only since 2012 it has been attracting participants, with increasing degree of 
price transparency and market liquidity. TTF is a virtual trading hub. As of 2014, 
TTF has taken first place in terms of traded volumes in Europe, overtaking the 
NBP. This has been partly attributed to increased liquidity at the TTF hub due to 
a change in balancing regime implemented in June 2014. TTF also remains a 
preferred benchmark for traders managing their gas portfolios. 
Zeebrugge (ZEE), in Belgium, started trading in 2000. Since 2012, there is a 
virtual hub,). Zeebrugge is also the physical location where the pipeline 
Interconnector, joining the UK with the Belgian market, and consequently with 
the Continental Europe markets, converges. Whilst both the NBP and TTF hubs 
are widely used for financial hedging and risk management, ZEE remains based 
on the balancing needs of the market participants, and/or spread trading 
between ZEE, and either NBP or TTF (Heather 2015).  
It should be noted that the Luxembourg and Belgian gas markets were merged 
at the end of 2015. This market integration reflects the European Union's 
ambition to create a borderless integrated gas market where gas can move freely 
from one country to another. ZTP is the trading point for the integrated market. 
The two TSOs keep their distinct identities and organisational structures. 
NetConnect Germany (NCG) and GasPool (GP), in Germany, are the two hubs 
corresponding to two market areas. Both started trading in 2009 although traded 
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volumes have been increasing since 2014. Trading activity is mainly driven by 
spot/prompt trades. Futures trading is also increasing, mostly at GasPool , 
because of the start of the Nord Stream pipeline linking Russia and Germany (in 
2012). The German configuration is different from the one in the rest of Europe, 
because the two hubs are run by several TSOs (8 for GasPool and 6 for NCG). If 
the German market cannot unite into one market area, this might prevent 
further development of a German hub. 
Point d'Echange de Gaz Nord (PEG Nord) and Trading Region South (TRS), in 
France, are the two hubs corresponding to two market areas. TRS was launched 
on 1 April 2015 as the product of the merger between the PEG Sud and the TIGF 
trading regions in the South of France, and is one of the first cases of successful 
market integration between gas hubs. TRS was established with the aim of 
increasing the liquidity and depth of the southern French market. PEG Nord has 
the majority of the traded volumes. The main problem is that there insufficient 
physical capacity in the connection of the two zones. PEG Nord is well connected 
to pipeline gas supplies and to LNG imports, while TRS depends on LNG imports, 
which may be supplemented by pipeline supplies from PEG Nord. There is a 
market-coupling scheme between the two areas which may work as long as 
there is a reasonably good physical infrastructure on both sides. The plans to 
increase the capacities between N/S have been postponed and should be ended 
in 2019. PEG Nord and TRS constitute two balancing areas for shippers and allow 
both for a bilateral OTC exchanges as well as exchanges on Powernext Gas. 
Different products can be traded at Powernext: within day, day-ahead, month 
ahead. On PEG Nord monthly, seasonal, quarterly and yearly products can be 
traded up to two years ahead. The price spread between the two zones The 
French National Regulator (CRE) wants to establish a unified trading zone for 
France in 2018.  
Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV), in Italy, is a virtual point, conceptually located 
between the entry and the exit points of the Italian network, where shippers can 
trade gas already entered in the main national grid, on a daily basis. PSV is the 
reference national balancing zone. Currently, PSV represents one of the main 
European gas marketplaces, having a unique position in terms of availability of 
gas from different sources, like Russia, Northern Europe (mainly Norway and The 
Netherlands), North Africa (Algeria and Libya), LNG imports (3 regasification 
plants) as well as of storage facilities (around 17 bcm of storage capacity). 
However a small quantity of gas is traded at the hub. The incumbent, ENI, has 
been forced to trade starting from 2012-13. Still the south/north transit capacity 
needs to be realised, mainly because of the arrival of new supplies, including the 
TAP pipeline in 2010.  
Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A. (GME) was assigned in 2009, on an 
exclusive basis, with the organisation and economic management of natural gas 
markets, which consist of the Platform for the trading of natural gas (P-GAS) and 
the Gas Market (MGAS). In 2013, GME also took over the management of 
physical forward gas markets. To trade on the P-GAS or MGAS operators must be 
authorised to carry out transactions at PSV. In the MGAS, the parties authorised 
may make forward purchases, also functional to balancing of the gas system, 
and spot purchases and sales of volumes of natural gas. 
Virtual Balancing Point (PVB), Spain. The Organised Gas Market on the Iberian 
Peninsula began operating in December 2015, once the regulatory framework 
had been established and the Spanish and Portuguese operators designed and 
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implemented an operating model for the Iberian gas market, which followed the 
guidelines contained in the European Gas Target Model to adapt to the specific 
needs of the Iberian gas system. MIBGAS S.A. is the operator of the Iberian gas 
market.  
The MIBGAS trading platform is used for the purchase and sale of natural gas 
with physical delivery at PVB for Within-Day, Day-Ahead, Balance of Month and 
Month-Ahead products.  
Virtual Trading Point (VTP), Austria. In Austria there is one of the most important 
trading points in Continental Europe, Baumgarten. Approximatively one third of 
all Russian gas exports to Europe flows through Baumgarten towards Germany, 
Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and the national market. The import terminal is owned 
and operated by Gas Connect Austria. The Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) 
hub started trading in 2005 and is the leading hub for gas trading in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 2013 a virtual hub, the VTP, was created with CEGH as its 
operator. Trading at VTP is developing, even though the majority of trades is led 
by spread with the TTF, NCG or PSV hubs.  
Gas Transfer Facility (GTF), Denmark. Energinet is an independent public 
enterprise owned by the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy. They own, 
operate and develop the transmission systems for electricity and natural gas in 
Denmark. The Danish gas market model offers shippers two ways to buy and sell 
gas: through the virtual point ETF (Exchange Transfer Facility) for trades 
executed on the Danish gas exchange, Gaspoint Nordic; through GTF (Gas 
Transfer Facility), the virtual point for bilateral trades in the secondary market. 
VOB, in Czech Republic, is at very early stages of trading, but has OTC brokers, 
and VOB future contracts are offered at the Austrian CEGH exchange. 
Other European natural gas virtual trading hubs are the Polish VPG, the 
Hungarian MGP, but they are hardly trading. 
 
Figure 8. EU gas hubs location 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 6. EU gas hubs and the TSOs that are operating at them 
Market area Hub TSO  
Austria VTP (CEGH) Gas Connect Austria GmbH 
TAG GmbH 
(Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH) 
Belgium ZTP (Zeebrugge Trading 
Point H-Zone) 
Fluxys Belgium S.A. 
Belgium ZEE (Zeebrugge Beach) Fluxys Belgium S.A. 
Czech 
Republic 
VOB NET4GAS, s.r.o. 
Denmark NPTF Energinet 
Denmark GTF (Bilateral Trading 
point) 
Energinet 
France-N PEG Nord GRTgaz 
France TRS GRTgaz, TIGF 
Germany GP (GasPool) Fluxys Deutschland 
GASCADE Gastransport 
Gastransport Nord 
Gasunie Deutschland  
jordgas Transport 
NEL Gastransport 
Nowega 
OPAL Gastransport 
Germany NCG (NetConnect 
Germany) 
bayernets 
Fluxys TENP 
GRTgaz Deutschland 
Open Grid Europe 
terranets bw 
Thyssengas 
Hungary MGP FGSZ 
Ireland IBP Gas Networks Ireland 
Italy PSV Snam Rete Gas 
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Netherlands TTF (Title Transfer 
Facility) 
Gasunie Transport Services 
Poland VPG GAZ-SYSTEM 
Spain PVB ENAGAS 
United 
Kingdom 
NBP (National Balancing 
Point) 
National Grid 
Source: adapted from ENTSOG 
The quantity of gas traded in a hub being the one of the most important 
characteristics of the liquidity of a hub, we show here below the traded volumes 
at the EU hubs in 2016. 
Figure 9. Traded volumes of gas on the main European hubs in 2016 
 
Source: own elaboration on DG Energy data (7) 
 The scoring of the European natural gas hubs  3.4.3
3.4.3.1 Scoring using the AGTM metrics  
The results of the performance of wholesale markets via the AGTM metrics are 
presented in (8). They show an improved performance compared to the first 
assessment in 2013, but most market areas are still some distance away from 
the indicative AGTM targets, especially for forward liquidity associated metrics. 
The market health and the market participant needs metrics are strongly 
correlated. Structural aspects influence the way in which a gas wholesale market 
can function properly. Markets in North West Europe score better on metrics 
related to diversity of supply and upstream concentration leading to better 
performing hubs. TTF and NBP continue to be the EU’s best functioning hubs. 
                                           
(7) see (EC 2016a), (EC 2016b), (EC 2017) 
(8)  ACER/CEER Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Gas Markets in 2016 - 
Gas Wholesale Markets Volume (October 2017) 
(https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Market%20Mo
nitoring%20Report%202016%20-%20GAS.pdf) 
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Based on these results, hubs are categorised in four groups:  
— Established hubs 
 Broad liquidity 
 Sizeable forward markets which contribute to supply hedging 
 Price reference for other EU hubs and for long-term contracts indexation 
— Advanced hubs 
 High liquidity 
 More reliant comparatively on spot products 
 Progress on supply hedging role but relatively lower liquidity levels of longer-
term products 
— Emerging hubs 
 Improving liquidity from a lower base taking advantage of enhanced 
interconnectivity and regulatory interventions 
 High reliance on long-term contracts and bilateral deals 
— Illiquid-incipient hubs 
 Embryonic liquidity at a low level and mainly focused on spot 
 Core reliance on long-term contracts and bilateral deals 
 Diverse group with some jurisdictions having 
 organised markets in early stage 
 to develop entry-exit systems 
Figure 10. ACER's ranking of the European hubs using the 2016 monitoring results 
 
Source: own elaboration on ACER data 
3.4.3.2 Scoring using OIES (P.Heather) metrics  
The latest report of OIES by P.H. and B.P. (2017) gives an update on the 
maturity and development of those hubs by applying the methodology in 3.3.2 
for the ranking of the hubs for 2016. 
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Table 7. OIES (P. Heather's) ranking of the European hubs using the 2016 data 
Hub Active 
market 
participants 
Traded 
products 
Traded volumes 
[TWh] 
Tradability 
index (Q4) 
Churn 
rate 
Final 
score 
Classification 
TTF > 40 53 22230 20 57.1 15 Mature 
NBP > 40 47 20045 19 22.1 15 Mature 
NCG 30 29 2080 16 4 10 Active 
GPL 30 23 1110 15 2.5 9 Active 
PSV 18 23 885 15 1.2 7 Poor 
ZEE+ZTP 15 17 780 10 4.1 7 Poor 
PEG Nord 15 18 550 14 1.7 7 Poor 
VTP 15 14 530 10 5.7 7 Poor 
VOB < 10 6 105 8 1.1 5 Inactive 
TRS < 10 13 100 7 0.6 5 Inactive 
PVB < 10 9 3 0 0.1 5 Inactive 
Source: (Heather and Petrovich 2017) 
 
The results are usually presented as in Figure 11 (left), but we present them also as Figure 11 (right) for a comparison with 
the ACER's ranking in Figure 10. 
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Figure 11. OIES (P. Heather's) ranking of the European hubs using the 2016 data 
  
Source: own elaboration on (Heather and Petrovich 2017) 
The political will, represented by the expected implementation dates for EU 
countries for the BAL NC is here below. 
Figure 12. Expected implementation dates for EU countries 
 
Source: own elaboration on ACER-ENTSOG data 
3.4.3.3 Scoring using EFET metrics  
Finally, the EFET metrics applied from 2014-2017 led to the following results. For 
the year 2017 and for comparison with the other metrics scorings, we present 
the results as a map in Figure 13. 
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Table 8. EFET's ranking of European hubs 
Hub 2014 2015 2016 2017 
NBP 20 20 20 20 
TTF 19 19.5 19.5 19 
NCG 15.5 19 19 17.5 
GASPOOL 16 19 19 17 
France 16 16.5 18.5 17.5 
ZTP 16 17.5 18 19 
Zee Beach 17 17 17 16.5 
PSV 10.5 15 15 16 
GTF 9 11 14 15.5 
VTP 13 13 13.5 16 
PVB 7 7 13.5 16 
Czech Republic 8 8.5 9.5 13 
Poland 4.5 5.5 9.5 10 
Hungary 5 6.5 9 12.5 
Slovakia 3.5 7 8 8.5 
Greece 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 
Romania 2.5 1.5 2 3 
Bulgaria 1.5 1 1.5 1 
Source: (EFET 2017) 
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Figure 13. EFET's ranking of European hubs 
 
Source: own elaboration on EFET data 
 The gas prices  3.4.4
The following analysis is given in (ACER/CEER 2017) concerning the evolution of 
gas prices in 2016. 
Gas prices in Europe in 2016 had two types of behaviour: decreasing in the first 
part of the year and increasing during the second one (see Figure 14). The 
decreasing prices may be explained by lower gas demand and lower oil prices on 
one hand and high gas storage levels and oversupply on another hand. The 
reversed trend in the last quarter was mainly explained by growing gas demand 
for gas-fired power generation, limited EU LNG deliveries, and an increase in US 
gas prices and coal price increases.  
The prices of oil-indexed long-term contracts were relatively competitive 
throughout 2016 and dropped below hub prices in the last part of the year.  
ACER (ACER/CEER 2017) assessed the gas sourcing costs in EU gas markets 
taking into account both hub prices and long-term contract prices. Yearly 
average results are presented in Figure 15.  
It should be noted that the spread of the sourcing between direct hub and long-
term gas contracts is narrowing. The rationale is:  
— lower oil prices are impacting oil-indexed gas contracts 
— hubs are more directly used in supply contracts’ indexations – or 
alternatively, providing orientation for price renegotiations. 
In the future, we will study the gas prices from the point of view of price 
convergence and correlation. 
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Figure 14. Gas prices in 2015-2016 at some European natural gas hubs 
 
Source: own elaboration on DG Energy data 
Figure 15. EU MSs assessed gas suppliers sourcing prices* 2016 (yearly average) 
 
* IMP stands for import prices declared at the border, PR for production and HUB for hub hedging prices 
Source: own elaboration on (ACER 2017) data 
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4 Network Code on Gas Balancing of Transmission Networks 
Balancing with regards to natural gas transportation refers to the activity of 
dealing with the difference of natural gas quantities injected to and withdrawn 
from the system. Before looking at balancing itself, the legal background is 
introduced and this particular mismatch will be examined in the general context 
of network use.  
4.1 Legal Background 
— DIRECTIVE 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (Directive) 
As part of the 3rd Energy Package Directive defined balancing as an "ancillary 
service" [Directive Article 2(14)] and declared that "… balancing the gas 
transmission system shall be objective, transparent and non-discriminatory, 
including rules for the charging of system users of their networks for energy 
imbalance." [Directive Article 13(3)]  
Furthermore "…the provision of balancing services … shall be performed in the 
most economic manner and provide appropriate incentives for network users to 
balance their input and off-takes. The balancing services shall be provided in a 
fair and non-discriminatory manner and be based on objective criteria;" 
[Directive Article 41(6)b)] 
— REGULATION (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks (Regulation, R.) 
The Regulation: 
 gives more details about the principles of balancing  
"1. Balancing rules shall be designed in a fair, non-discriminatory and 
transparent manner and shall be based on objective criteria. Balancing rules 
shall reflect genuine system needs taking into account the resources 
available to the transmission system operator. Balancing rules shall be 
market-based. 
2. In order to enable network users to take timely corrective action, the 
transmission system operator shall provide sufficient, well-timed and reliable 
on-line based information on the balancing status of network users.  
The information provided shall reflect the level of information available to the 
transmission system operator and the settlement period for which imbalance 
charges are calculated.  
No charge shall be made for the provision of information under this 
paragraph.  
3. Imbalance charges shall be cost-reflective to the extent possible, whilst 
providing appropriate incentives on network users to balance their input and 
off-take of gas. They shall avoid cross-subsidisation between network users 
and shall not hamper the entry of new market entrants.  
Any calculation methodology for imbalance charges as well as the final tariffs 
shall be made public by the competent authorities or the transmission system 
operator, as appropriate.  
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4. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators endeavour 
to harmonise balancing regimes and streamline structures and levels of 
balancing charges in order to facilitate gas trade." [R. Article 21] and  
 stipulates that a network code should establish detailed rules for balancing 
"The network codes … shall cover the following areas, taking into account, if 
appropriate, regional special characteristics: … (h) rules for trading related to 
technical and operational provision of network access services and system 
balancing; … (j) balancing rules including network-related rules on 
nominations procedure, rules for imbalance charges and rules for operational 
balancing between transmission system operators’ systems;" [R. Article 8(6)] 
— REGULATION (EU) No 312/2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas 
Balancing of Transmission Networks (Balancing Regulation, BR.) 
The BR. sets the detailed rules and will be analysed in this section.  
4.2 Deadlines 
By default the requirements set out in the BR. were to be fulfilled by October 
2015. In some cases an extension to October 2016 and April 2019 was granted 
and the April 2019 deadline can be extended by the national regulatory authority 
to April 2024. Up until full compliance with the BR. interim measures are 
permitted.  
"In the absence of sufficient liquidity of the short term wholesale gas market, 
suitable interim measures … shall be implemented by the transmission system 
operators. Balancing actions undertaken by the transmission system operator in 
case of interim measures shall foster the liquidity of the short term wholesale gas 
market to the extent possible." [BR. Article 45(1)] 
If interim measures are applied an annual report has to be prepared. 
"Where the transmission system operator foresees implementing or continuing to 
implement interim measures, it shall prepare" an annual report." [BR. Article 
46(1)] 
4.3 Definitions 
‘allocation’ means the quantity of gas attributed to a network user by a 
transmission system operator as an input or an off-take expressed in kWh for the 
purpose of determining the daily imbalance quantity; [BR. Article 3(15)] 
‘balancing action’ means an action undertaken by the transmission system 
operator to change the gas flows onto or off the transmission network, excluding 
those actions related to gas unaccounted for as off-taken from the system and 
gas used by the transmission system operator for the operation of the system; 
[BR. Article 3(2)] 
‘balancing period’ means the period within which the off-take of an amount of 
natural gas, expressed in units of energy, must be offset by every network user 
by means of the injection of the same amount of natural gas into the 
transmission network in accordance with the transport contract or the network 
code; [R. Article 2(10)] 
‘balancing platform’ means a trading platform where a transmission system 
operator is a trading participant to all trades; [BR. Article 3(6)] 
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‘balancing portfolio’ means a grouping of a network user’s inputs and off-
takes; [BR. Article 3(13)] 
‘balancing service’ means a service provided to a transmission system 
operator via a contract for gas required to meet short term fluctuations in gas 
demand or supply, which is not a short term standardised product; [BR. Article 
3(7)] 
‘balancing zone’ means an entry-exit system to which a specific balancing 
regime is applicable and which may include distribution systems or part of them; 
[BR. Article 3(1)] 
‘confirmed quantity’ means the quantity of gas confirmed by a transmission 
system operator to be scheduled or re-scheduled to flow on gas day D; [BR. 
Article 3(8)] 
‘contracted capacity’ means capacity that the transmission system operator 
has allocated to a network user by means of a transport contract;[R. Article 
2(19)] 
‘daily imbalance charge’ means the amount of money a network user pays or 
receives in respect of a daily imbalance quantity; [BR. Article 3(9)] 
‘daily metered’ means that the gas quantity is measured and collected once per 
gas day; [BR. Article 3(10)]" 
‘gas day’ generally means a 24-hour period beginning at 5 am GMT, the actual 
gas day is marked D, following gas day D-1 and followed by gas day D+1; 
‘intraday metered’ means that the gas quantity is measured and collected a 
minimum of two times within the gas day; [BR. Article 3(11)] 
‘network user’ means a customer or a potential customer of a transmission 
system operator, and transmission system operators themselves in so far as it is 
necessary for them to carry out their functions in relation to transmission; [R. 
Article 2(11)] 
‘neutrality charge for balancing’ means a charge amounting to the difference 
between the amounts received or receivable and the amounts paid or payable by 
the transmission system operator due to performance of its balancing activities 
which is payable to or recoverable from the relevant network users; [BR. Article 
3(3)] 
‘nomination’ means the prior reporting by the network user to the transmission 
system operator of the actual flow that the network user wishes to inject into or 
withdraw from the system; [R. Article 2(7)] 
‘non daily metered’ means that the gas quantity is measured and collected less 
frequently than once per gas day; [BR. Article 3(12)] 
‘notification quantity’ means the quantity of gas transferred between a 
transmission system operator and a network user or network users or balancing 
portfolios, as appropriate; [BR. Article 3(14)] 
‘re-nomination cycle’ means the process carried out by the transmission 
system operator in order to provide a network user with the message regarding 
the confirmed quantities following the receipt of a re-nomination; [BR. Article 
3(16)] 
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‘trading participant’ means a network user or a transmission system operator 
holding a contract with the trading platform operator and satisfying the 
conditions necessary to transact on the trading platform. [BR. Article 3(5)] 
‘trading platform’ means an electronic platform provided and operated by a 
trading platform operator by means of which trading participants may post and 
accept, including the right to revise and withdraw, bids and offers for gas 
required to meet short term fluctuations in gas demand or supply, in accordance 
with the terms and conditions applicable on the trading platform and at which the 
transmission system operator trades for the purpose of undertaking balancing 
actions; [BR. Article 3(4)] 
‘within day charge’ means a charge levied or a payment made by a 
transmission system operator on or to a network user as a result of a within day 
obligation; [BR. Article 3(17)] 
‘within day obligation’ means a set of rules regarding network users’ inputs 
and off-takes within the gas day imposed by a transmission system operator on 
network users; [BR. Article 3(18)] 
4.4 Imbalance 
Generally, in order to use the natural gas high pressure transportation system a 
network user has to book capacity first and then give a nomination, typically for 
a gas day. Contracted capacity, nomination and the real flow can be different. 
Some of the differences pertain to network use while others are undesirable and 
therefore discouraged.  
 Not accepted differences in network use 4.4.1
Table 9. Not accepted differences in network use 
 
Not accepted relation 
 
Nominated input/off-take 
> 
Contracted input/off-take 
capacity 
Real input/off-take 
> 
Contracted input/off-take 
capacity 
Nominated input  
 
nominated off-take 
Real input/off-take  
<, > 
Nominated input/off-take 
Real input 
<, > 
real off-take 
— Nominated input/off-take – Contracted input/off-take capacity 
Although daily (or even within-day) capacities are available, usually capacities 
are contracted for a longer term (i.e. month, quarter, year, multiple years). 
Since contracted capacity means the highest used capacity for a contract term, a 
nomination lower than the contracted capacity is the most common case. On the 
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other hand nominations higher than the contracted capacity are normally 
rejected. 
— Real input/off-take – Contracted input/off-take capacity 
Just as in case of nomination (and for the same reasons) the most common case 
is when the real flow is smaller than the contracted capacity. However a flow 
higher than the contracted capacity can occur (capacity overshoot), and usually 
results in (w/o a tolerance) a penalty. 
— Nominated input – Nominated off-take 
A network user has to nominate injection to and withdrawal from the natural gas 
transmission system. The acceptance of different input and off-take nominations 
are required by the BR.  
— Real input/off-take – Nominated input/off-take 
Difference between the actual flow and the (re-)nomination is not unusual either; 
however it can be surcharged as well.  
Real input – real off-take (imbalance) 
A mismatch between incoming and outgoing flows is an imbalance which is the 
subject of this section. The action that it will bring about depends on the extent 
of imbalance. In the order of growing severity it is just settled financially, or 
requires intervention to change physical flows either at a system level (Virtual 
trading point [VTP]) or at a local level (specific entry/exit point). 
4.5 Balancing regime 
As a general principle the BR. declares that: 
"The network users shall be responsible to balance their balancing portfolios in 
order to minimise the need for transmission system operators to undertake 
balancing actions set out under this Regulation." [BR. Article 4(1)]  
In other words in case network users are not able to balance their daily flows the 
"The transmission system operator shall undertake balancing actions in order to: 
(a) maintain the transmission network within its operational limits; 
(b) achieve an end of day linepack position in the transmission network different 
from the one anticipated on the basis of expected inputs and off-takes for that 
gas day, consistent with economic and efficient operation of the transmission 
network." [BR. Article 6(1)] 
The principle of residual balancing indicates the ability and willingness of network 
users to balance their portfolios both via physical changes in their injections and 
withdrawals and via changes in ownership of gas quantities that are already in 
the system. This also means that in a well-functioning regime the TSO has 
marginal role in the actual balancing. According to ACER Report on the 
implementation of the Balancing Network Code of 7 November 2016 [ACER 
Report 2016] network users need information, access to gas and network 
flexibility. In order to achieve this goal the TSO and regulatory bodies have to set 
up the framework that meets certain conditions in connection with the items 
below: 
1. Title transfer 
2. Trade notification 
 43 
3. Trading platform 
4. Short term standardised products (STSPs) 
5. Virtual trading point (VTP) 
6. Incentives 
7. Nomination and capacity booking regime 
8. Information 
9. Neutrality 
10. Linepack flexibility 
The subsections below will include the explanation of these items, and 
information about related "interim measures" and "compliance". This latter is 
based on the ACER Report on the implementation of the Balancing Network Code 
(Second edition) of 16 November 2017 [ACER Report 2017] Volume II. 
Evaluation of compliance is simplified compared to the report, and countries 
appear as complying or not complying in a rigorous and somewhat arbitrary way. 
Essentially if a country does not comply with the word of the BR., it is regarded 
as "non-complying". The only way for a country to be classified as complying in 
case deviations exist is, if their impact on the balancing regime seems to be 
negligible. In the compliance part 22 countries were looked at, with Belgium and 
Luxemburg was taken as one (common balancing zone) and Poland being 
evaluated based on the high calorific zone. Sweden is evaluated individually, 
despite the intention of merging with the Danish balancing system.  
 Title transfer  4.5.1
Title transfer means the change in ownership of gas that is already in the natural 
gas transmission system, and should be independent of physical flows, i.e. non-
physical flow related title transfers can be the tool for shippers to wash out 
opposite portfolio imbalances. The goal is that title transfers take place on a 
transparent platform in a standardised way and become the major tool for 
balancing (discussed at 4.5.4).  
 Trade notification 4.5.2
A Trade notification is the confirmation that an exchange of ownership occurred. 
From a balancing point of view it is crucial that these confirmations are 
processed by TSO in the shortest possible time.  
"1. Gas transfer between two balancing portfolios within one balancing zone shall 
be made through disposing and acquiring trade notifications submitted to the 
transmission system operator in respect of the gas day.  
2. The timing for submitting, withdrawing and amending trade notifications shall 
be defined by the transmission system operator in the transport contract or other 
legally binding agreement with network users taking into account the time, if 
any, for processing the trade notifications. The transmission system operator 
shall enable the network users to submit trade notifications close to the time 
when the trade notification becomes effective.  
3. The transmission system operator shall minimise the time for processing trade 
notifications. The time for processing shall not take more than thirty minutes 
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except where the time when the trade notification becomes effective permits to 
extend the time for processing up to two hours." [BR. Article 5] 
Besides processing time, another crucial condition to full compliance with the BR. 
is the access to market for "paper traders" in order to increase liquidity.  
"Network users shall have the possibility to enter into a legally binding 
agreement with a transmission system operator which enables them to submit 
trade notifications irrespective of whether they have contracted transport 
capacity or not." [BR. Article 4(3)] 
"A network user may make a trade notification on a gas day irrespective of 
whether any nomination was made by this network user for that gas day." [BR. 
Article 5(8)] 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 16 
Non-complying 6 
Compliance ratio 73% 
 Trading platform 4.5.3
The Trading Platform is the venue where trades take place. It needs to be easily 
accessible and preferably enable exchange of standardised products that ensure 
high turnover (liquidity). Besides being a liquid market that facilitates balancing, 
another benefit of a Trading Platform is the availability of market prices for the 
cash-out mechanism (discussed at 4.5.6.1). 
Interim measures: 
Up until the establishment of a trading platform interim measures are applicable 
such as a Balancing Platform. The difference between a Trading Platform and a 
Balancing Platform is, that in the former case the TSO is one of the participants, 
while in the latter case the TSO is the counterparty to all trades. Alternative to a 
balancing platform is the balancing service. 
"The transmission system operator is entitled to procure balancing services for 
those situations in which short term standardised products will not or are not 
likely to provide the response necessary to keep the transmission network within 
its operational limits or in the absence of liquidity of trade in short term 
standardised products." [BR. Article 8(1)] 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 14 
Non-complying 8 
Compliance ratio 64% 
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 Short term standardised products (STSPs) 4.5.4
This is a feature of all well-known exchanges in order to ensure liquidity in the 
market. In this specific case the BR. stipulates that the possibility of trading with 
them either on within-day or day ahead basis seven days a week must be 
ensured. According to the Balancing Regulation there are three possible types of 
STSPs. 
One of them is a title product, which is linked to ownership change and does not 
necessarily cause any change in the flows. Perhaps it sounds counterintuitive 
that by buying or selling an instrument that is not directly linked to changes in 
physical flow would help the TSO in its operational balancing activity. However, 
this is the right tool to give a signal to shippers to react (adjust physical flows) in 
order to keep the system in balance. Therefore it is the preferred tool among 
STSPs.  
The other two are the Locational and the Temporal Product. The first one is used 
when the imbalance affects a specific part of the system, while the second one is 
needed for a certain time period during the day. According to the Balancing 
Regulation the combination of the two is also possible. 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 8 
Non-complying 14 
Compliance ratio 36% 
 Virtual trading point (VTP) 4.5.5
A virtual trading point is a notional point referring to the system where exchange 
of gas quantities can take place. 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 15 
Non-complying 7 
Compliance ratio 68% 
 Incentives 4.5.6
According to ACER Report 2016: 
"Network users shall be incentivised, not obliged, to balance." 
"The Code imposed appropriate incentives on network users to balance, 
particularly through daily cash-out, and only where necessary modest within-day 
restrictions/incentives were foreseen." [ACER Report 2017 Volume I] 
Therefore these two incentives will be analysed in details. 
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4.5.6.1 Cash-out mechanism 
As stated before a functioning market would not only facilitate efficient 
balancing, but would provide prices for the financial settlement after the gas day. 
If a Shipper withdraws more than injects, or the other way around, it needs to 
face the financial consequences, i.e. imbalance charges.  
"The daily imbalance charge shall be cost reflective and shall take account of the 
prices associated with transmission system operator’s balancing actions, if any, 
and of the small adjustment…" [BR. Article 19(3)]  
In order to calculate the imbalance charge for each Balancing Portfolio the 
imbalance quantity and an imbalance unit charge needs to be calculated.  
4.5.6.1.1 Daily imbalance quantity calculation 
daily imbalance quantity = inputs – off-takes 
The daily imbalance quantity can be adjusted where: 
"(a) a linepack flexibility service is offered; and/or 
(b) any arrangement is in place whereby network users provide gas, 
including gas in kind, to cover: 
(i) gas unaccounted for as off taken from the system, such as 
losses, metering errors; and/or 
(ii) gas used by the transmission system operator for the operation 
of the system, such as fuel gas" [BR. Article 21(2)] 
4.5.6.1.2 Applicable price 
According to the BR. a so-called marginal sell or buy price has to be calculated 
and used with the possibility of a "small adjustment".  
"A marginal sell price and a marginal buy price shall be calculated for each gas 
day pursuant to the following: 
(a) a marginal sell price is the lower of: 
(i) the lowest price of any sales of title products in which the 
transmission system operator is involved in respect of the gas day; 
or 
(ii) the weighted average price of gas in respect of that gas day, 
minus a small adjustment. 
(b) a marginal buy price is the higher of: 
(i) the highest price of any purchases of title products in which the transmission 
system operator is involved in respect of the gas day; or 
(ii) the weighted average price of gas in respect of that gas day, 
plus a small adjustment." [BR. Article 22(2)] 
"The small adjustment shall: 
(a) incentivise network users to balance their inputs and off-takes; 
(b) be designed and applied in a non-discriminatory manner in order to: 
(i) not deter market entry; 
(ii) not impede the development of competitive markets; 
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(c) not have a detrimental impact on cross-border trade; 
(d) not result in network users’ excessive financial exposure to daily 
imbalance charges." [BR. Article 22(6)] 
"…The value of the small adjustment shall not exceed ten percent of the 
weighted average price unless the transmission system operator concerned can 
justify otherwise" [BR. Article 22(7)] 
Once both the imbalance quantity and the applicable price are available the 
product of the two will give the daily imbalance charge. This charge is to be paid 
to the network users that injected more than withdrew and payable by those 
network users that injected less than withdrew. 
Interim measures: 
As long as prices are not available from a functioning market "the price 
derivation may be based upon an administered price, a proxy for a market price 
or a price derived from balancing platform trades".[BR. Article 49(2)] 
Regarding quantity a tolerance can be applied "in case network users do not 
have access: 
(a) to a short term wholesale gas market that has sufficient liquidity; 
(b) to gas required to meet short term fluctuations in gas demand or 
supply; or 
(c) to sufficient information regarding their inputs and off-takes." [BR. 
Article 50(1)] 
"The tolerance level shall be the maximum quantity of gas to be bought or sold 
by each network user at a weighted average price. If there is a remaining 
quantity of gas that constitutes each network user’s daily imbalance quantity 
which exceeds the tolerance level, it shall be sold or bought at marginal sell price 
or marginal buy price." [BR. Article 50(4)] 
"The tolerance level shall be calculated on the basis of each network user’s inputs 
and off-takes, excluding trades at the virtual trading point, for each gas day. 
…"[BR. Article 50(6)] 
"The tolerance level applicable for a non-daily metered off-take … shall be based 
upon the difference between the relevant forecast of a network user’s non-daily 
metered off-takes and the allocation for non-daily metered off-take." [BR. Article 
50(7)] 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 10 
Non-complying 12 
Compliance ratio 45% 
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4.5.6.2 Within day obligations (WDOs) 
The BR. suggests a predominantly daily balancing regime, but permits WDOs 
where they seem inevitable due to system characteristics. They have to be 
"modest" [ACER Report 2017] and justifiable. Furthermore the application of 
WDOs is up to a set of conditions (e.g. adequate information supply, priority of 
end of the gas day position in financial settlement, extensive consultation with 
stakeholders, etc.). 
"A transmission system operator is only entitled to apply within day obligations in 
order to incentivise network users to manage their within day position in view of 
ensuring the system integrity of its transmission network and minimising its need 
to undertake balancing actions." [BR. Article 24(1)] 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 20 
Non-complying 2 
Compliance ratio 91% 
 Nomination and capacity booking regime 4.5.7
This subsection is rather focusing on nomination rules than capacity booking. As 
for capacity booking the requirement is the establishment of an entry-exit 
system and flexible access to capacities (e.g. within-day capacities). 
With regards to (re-)nomination on interconnection points the BR. defines the 
deadlines before the gas day and within the gas day. The BR. clearly indicates 
that network users have to have the opportunity to modify their nominations 
within the gas day up until at least three hours before the end of the gas day 
(D). In case of re-nomination the flow must be able to start at most two hours 
after the re-nomination. BR. defines the cases of rejection of (re-)nominations at 
interconnection points. 
"1.   The transmission system operator may reject: 
(a) a nomination or re-nomination no later than two hours after the 
nomination deadline or the beginning of the re-nomination cycle in the 
following cases: 
(i) it does not comply with the requirements as to its content; 
(ii) it is submitted by an entity other than a network user; 
(iii) the acceptance of the daily nomination or re-nomination would 
result in a negative implied nomination flow rate; 
(iv) it exceeds the network user’s allocated capacity; 
(b) a re-nomination no later than two hours after the beginning of the re-
nomination cycle in the following additional cases: 
(i) it exceeds the network user’s allocated capacity for the 
remaining hours, unless this re-nomination is submitted in order to 
request interruptible capacity, where offered by the transmission 
system operator; 
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(ii) the acceptance of the hourly re-nomination would result in an 
expected gas flow change before the end of the re-nomination cycle. 
2.   The transmission system operator shall not reject a network user’s 
nomination and re-nomination on the sole ground that this network user’s 
intended inputs are not equal to its intended off-takes. 
3.   In case a re-nomination is rejected, the transmission system operator shall 
use the network user’s last confirmed quantity, if any." [BR. Article 17] 
Compliance: 
Compliance is evaluated based on nomination conditions. 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 18 
Non-complying 4 
Compliance ratio 82% 
 Information 4.5.8
From a balancing point of view the most important information that the network 
user has to have is access to its actual balance before and during the gas day. 
Because of it within-day supply of updated information is necessary.  
"Where the transmission system operator is required to provide information to 
network users to enable them to manage their exposures associated with within 
day positions, it shall be provided to them regularly. Where applicable, this 
information shall be provided upon a request submitted by each network user 
once." [BR. Article 24(2)] 
Depending on the frequency of meter reading the precise monitoring of a 
network user's position can be a challenge, and of course in those cases where 
the allocations cannot be done unambiguously by metered data, alternative data 
(e.g. forecasts) will be used as a substitute.  
"Where a measured quantity cannot be obtained from a meter, a replacement 
value may be used. This replacement value shall be used as an alternative 
reference without any further warranty from the transmission system operator." 
[BR. Article 33(2)] 
To ensure that reliable data are available, and allocations are based on reliable 
data as well, the BR. defines how network users and operators of connected 
systems in the same balancing zone have to supply meter data to the TSO and 
forecasting party. 
The Balancing Regulation differentiates between intraday, daily and non-daily 
measurements. In general in all three cases the network user is eligible to two 
updates either based on meter reading or forecast. 
In order to carry out the financial settlements after the gas day, an initial 
allocation of quantities needs to be done at no later than the end of the gas day 
following the gas day in question (end of D+1). 
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Interim measure: 
In case end of D+1 deadline is not feasible for initial allocation, D+3 is 
applicable. 
Compliance: 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 7 
Non-complying 15 
Compliance ratio 32% 
 Neutrality 4.5.9
Besides encouraging network users to balance their portfolios, on the other side 
the neutrality principle is to ensure TSO's marginal role in balancing the system 
and discourage the TSO to impede network users in their balancing efforts.  
"The transmission system operator shall not gain or lose by the payment and 
receipt of daily imbalance charges, within day charges, balancing actions charges 
and other charges related to its balancing activities, which shall be considered as 
all the activities undertaken by the transmission system operator to fulfil the 
obligations set out in this Regulation." [BR. Article 29(1)] 
"Where an incentive to promote efficient undertaking of balancing actions is 
implemented, the aggregate financial loss shall be limited to the transmission 
system operator’s inefficiently incurred costs and revenues." [BR. Article 29(3)] 
For enforcing the neutrality principle the following information have to be 
available to network users: 
"Transmission system operators shall publish the relevant data regarding the 
aggregate charges referred to in paragraph 1 and the aggregate neutrality 
charges for balancing, at least at the same frequency as the respective charges 
are invoiced to network users, but no less than once per month." [BR. Article 
29(4)] 
Compliance: 
In this case the evaluation was less rigorous. If neutrality related amounts were 
not relevant due to the nature of the balancing system or were not handled 
separately in the compensation mechanism the country was still deemed 
complying. 
 No. of countries (total: 22)  
Complying 16 
Non-complying 6 
Compliance ratio 73% 
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 Linepack flexibility service 4.5.10
The linepack flexibility service can give extra flexibility to network users based on 
the fact that the system remains safely operable in a given pressure range. As a 
consequence the TSO can offer this service to the extent it does not jeopardise 
system integrity. 
However, due to the fact that this is an extra service offered by the system 
operator, the neutrality principle in this case is not applicable. 
"The neutrality mechanism … shall not apply to the linepack flexibility service 
unless otherwise decided by the national regulatory authority." [BR. Article 
43(5)] 
The possibility of offering linepack flexibility service is contingent on different 
conditions: 
"1.   Linepack flexibility service can only be provided once all the following 
criteria are met: 
(a) the transmission system operator shall not need to enter into any 
contracts with any other infrastructure provider, such as storage system 
operator or LNG system operator, for the purpose of provision of a 
linepack flexibility service; 
(b) the revenues generated by the transmission system operator from the provision of a 
linepack flexibility service shall at least be equal to the costs incurred or to be incurred in 
providing this service; 
(d) the transmission system operator shall not charge, either directly or 
indirectly, a network user for any costs incurred by the provision of a 
linepack flexibility service, should this network user not contract for it; 
and… 
2.   The transmission system operator shall prioritise the reduction of within day 
obligations over the provision of a linepack flexibility service." [BR. Article 44] 
4.6 Case Study: The Dutch balancing regime 
The study is based on the information found on the website (9) of Netherlands 
Gasunie Transport Services (GTS). 
GTS owns and operates (TSO) the national grid. The major trading hub 
(established in 2003) for the gas already injected to the system is the Title 
Transfer Facility (TTF). This virtual marketplace is available for paper trading. 
The exchange where natural gas trades take place is ICE ENDEX. 
When calculating the balance of a particular Shipper (portfolio balance), both 
physical injections/withdrawals and transactions at TTF are taken into account on 
an hourly basis. The Dutch system is using the terms System Balance Signal 
(SBS) for system level net balance and Portfolio Imbalance Signals (POSs) 
referring to Balancing Portfolios. The actual balance of the system is published 
according to the figure below. 
  
                                           
(9)  https://www.gasunietransportservices.nl 
 52 
Figure 16. System balance signal (SBS) 
 
  Source: (https://www.gasunietransportservices.nl) 
The black line represents the physical balance of the system (SBS). The graph 
shows the system balance in a somewhat counterintuitive way, as the negative 
range represent surplus in the system, while the positive range a deficit. This 
kind of presentation is of common use, since the TSO needs to buy natural gas 
(cost element) when the system has a surplus, and vice versa in case of a deficit. 
The red and blue lines represent helpers and causers (veroorzakers). Causers are 
the ones that have an imbalance of the same sign as the system. Causers will 
bear the financial consequences of a balancing action.  
Balancing actions take place on ICE ENDEX within-day market by the TSO placing 
a sell or buy bid. The graph below illustrates how balancing actions are carried 
out by the TSO. The aim of TSO is to keep the imbalance in the dark green zone, 
and if it is outside that zone, then to bring it back. Depending on the severity of 
imbalance the TSO either buys an end-of-day product (less severe) or a 1-hour 
product (more severe). 
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Figure 17. Balancing action 
 
Source: (https://www.gasunietransportservices.nl) 
GTS offers Linepack Flexibility Service (LFS) for a charge, based on the principle 
that the SBS is in the dark green zone at the end of the gas day. This means that 
for those shippers that use LFS, the linepack quantity is available at the end of 
the gas day to even out their imbalances. However, actual exchange of gas 
between the Shipper and the TSO will not occur, the imbalance is rolled over to 
the beginning of the next gas day. This service is available to those shippers as 
well that have neither capacity booked nor nomination for the given gas day. 
Figure 18. Linepack flexibility service 
 
Source: (https://www.gasunietransportservices.nl) 
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4.7 ACER evaluation 
Besides monitoring compliance ACER looked at quantitative data and has worked 
out indicators to evaluate balancing regimes. This section is an extract from 
ACER Report 2017 Volume I.  
 Definitions 4.7.1
— TSO balancing action. The TSO’s balancing actions are measured in energy 
units and can be buy or sell actions. TSO balancing actions mean that the 
TSO is buying or selling on behalf of the system. TSO buying actions should 
be associated with actions to get more gas onto a short system. TSO selling 
actions are associated with addressing a gas surplus in the system that is a 
long system. 
— Sell and Buy System/TSO actions. A sell action from a TSO decreases the 
quantity of gas in the network, via either turning down the entry or turning up 
the exit points of the balancing zone though network users’ renominations. 
On the other hand, a buy action from a TSO has the intention of increasing 
the quantity of gas in the network, via either turning up the entry or turning 
down the exit points of the balancing zone through network users’ 
renominations. The TSO will sell gas when the system is long, or expected to 
be unacceptably long and it will buy gas in the opposite case, in its role of 
system balancer. Hence, a TSO Buy for balancing purposes can be referred to 
as a System Buy. Similarly, a TSO Sell for balancing purposes can be referred 
to as a System Sell. The chart below shows the TSO/system buy and sell 
actions for the Gas year 2015/16 with daily granularity. 
Figure 19. TSO/system buy and sell actions 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
— Network Users’ Imbalances. The difference between each network user’s 
injections into and withdrawals from the transmission network, plus the net 
gas exchanged at the VTP, defines the network user’s imbalance. Imbalances 
are aggregated according to the sign of the imbalance, yielding an aggregated 
network users’ over-delivery (sum of all “long” accounts on the day) and, 
separately, aggregated network users’ under-delivery (sum of all “short” 
accounts on the day). The individual network users’ imbalances are not 
publicly available.  
— Long and Short Imbalance Positions. The aggregated network users’ 
imbalance is labelled as “long” for those network users that inject, 
individually, more gas into their daily balance account than the gas they 
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withdraw. In the Report convention, “long” imbalances have a negative sign 
and therefore occupy the negative area of the respective chart. On the other 
hand, the network users’ imbalance is labelled as “short” for those network 
users that, individually, inject less gas than the gas they withdraw. In the 
Report convention, “short” imbalances have a positive sign and therefore 
occupy the positive area of the respective chart. The inversed convention is 
used to show how these positions affect the neutrality account. If the network 
users are short, the TSO in its role of settlement agent sells gas via imbalance 
cash-out to network user. If the network users are long, the TSO in its role as 
settlement agent buys gas via imbalance cash-out from network users. The 
chart below focuses on the Imbalance position of all network users. It 
shows the aggregated daily imbalances for all long network users below the 
zero line, and the aggregated daily imbalance of all short network users 
above the zero line. 
Figure 20. Imbalance positions of all network users 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
— Cumulative Commercial Imbalances. It is the combined commercial effect 
of network users and TSO balancing actions. The accumulation takes account 
of all the balances up to and including a given Gas Day. The imbalances could 
have either a positive or a negative sign. 
— Neutrality Energy Flows or Transactions. As explained through the 
definitions above (Sell and Buy System/TSO actions and Long and Short 
Imbalance Positions), there are four energy transactions associated with 
neutrality. In this Report, energy and their related cashflows are considered 
on both a daily and (gas) yearly basis. 
— Net energy. The quantities of energy purchased and sold via the four energy 
flows are unlikely to net to zero. The net energy represents the difference 
between energy sales and purchases originating from the four neutrality 
energy flows. For example, when energy sales are greater than purchases 
neutrality has made a net energy sale. Furthermore, when purchases are 
greater than sales then neutrality has made a net energy purchase. 
— Net financial neutrality. The financial effects of the four energy flows are 
also unlikely to net to zero. Net financial neutrality is the sum of financial 
inflows to neutrality less financial outflows. In other words, it is the net 
amount of money associated with TSO/System Sells and Network User 
Imbalance Short Positions less the amount of money associated with 
TSO/System Buys and Network User Imbalance Long Positions. Where net 
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financial neutrality is positive (cashflow), surplus cash is available for 
redistribution to network users. Where net financial neutrality is negative 
(cashflow), the deficit will be recovered from network users. The chart below 
presents the daily total net sum of revenues and costs the system collects 
associated with the four basic neutrality energy transactions, cumulated 
over the period of analysis: System Buy/Sells and Network User Imbalance 
Long/Short Positions. In particular, the chart shows the development of the 
net financial neutrality cumulating the daily values over the analysis period. 
Figure 21. Neutrality energy transactions 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
— The interaction between net energy and net financial neutrality. The 
net financial neutrality indicates whether the operation of the balancing 
regime is generating a cash surplus or cash deficit associated with the four 
energy transactions. The net energy position influences the net financial 
neutrality. For example, if the net energy position represents a net sell, the 
associated quantity of net gas sale will have contributed a revenue to the 
cashflows. Similarly, if the net energy position is a buy, then this should be 
associated with a cost in the net financial neutrality. These revenues and 
costs, in the end, are distributed back to the network users via the neutrality 
charge. For avoidance of doubt, the net energy and net financial will not 
necessarily have the same sign. 
— Net adjusted financial neutrality. The net adjusted financial neutrality is a 
measure designed to remove the effect of the net energy from the net 
financial neutrality. Where net energy is positive the likely cost of the net 
purchase will have contributed to net financial neutrality. Similarly, where net 
energy is negative the likely revenue will have contributed to net financial 
neutrality. The approach applies an estimated gas price to the net energy and 
then adjusts the net financial neutrality to remove the net energy’s 
contributory value. The adjusted value is distributed back to the network 
users. The idea is to deliver an estimate of the overall financial effect of 
neutrality that is energy neutral and can be used for comparative purposes. 
This provides a better indication of the overall cost or revenue generated in 
individual regimes.  
— Linepack. The volume of gas in the system at a given point in time is 
referred to as inventory, stock, or linepack. The linepack is the cumulative 
difference of total inputs less total off-takes. Typically, linepack levels are 
calculated by multiplying the physical volume of the network by the pressure 
levels observed or derived. 
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— Linepack flexibility. Gas systems can be safely operated within a certain 
pressure range. A range of linepack levels corresponds to this pressure range. 
This is the linepack flexibility acceptable for the system. In a well-functioning 
balancing regime, network users access an appropriate proportion of linepack 
flexibility. Economically efficient access to existing system flexibility should be 
provided without creating unduly excessive costs to users. Inappropriate costs 
to the TSO associated with excessive linepack level variation should also be 
avoided. The Report plots, where available, two graphics: one on Cumulative 
Commercial Imbalances and another on physical linepack data. The 
combined effect of commercial actions of network users and any balancing 
actions taken by the TSO will have an effect on the physical linepack position. 
Changes in the linepack position, i.e. the difference between the opening and 
closing linepack position, should at least partly reflect the net daily 
commercial imbalance position changes. Where day-on-day physical linepack 
changes are not close to the anticipated effect arising from the day’s 
commercial imbalances, the reasons should be investigated and explained to 
ensure confidence in the operation of the regime. Reasons behind such 
differences may be i) errors arising as a result of a persistent bias in metering 
ii) the illustration that commercial balancing actions are not driven by physical 
balancing needs20; (iii) other TSO actions, effectively outside of the Code’s 
jurisdiction. 
Figure 22. Cumulative commercial imbalances – physical linepack data 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
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 Indicators: 4.7.2
4.7.2.1 TSO's balancing actions  
Table 10. TSO's balancing actions 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
 
4.7.2.2 Network users’ imbalance cash-out 
Table 11. Network users’ imbalance cash-out 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
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4.7.2.3 Neutrality 
Table 12. Neutrality 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
 
4.7.2.4 Linepack levels 
Table 13. Linepack levels 
 
Source: (ACER Report 2017) 
4.8 EFET market report 
The BR. and as a consequence this section is mingling conditions of a well-
functioning market and rules of balancing. This is understandable considering 
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that liquid market is a prerequisite for efficient balancing. For this reason it 
seems reasonable to look at the analysis of EFET of different markets. Please see 
Table 5 and Table 8. 
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5 Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas 
Transmission Systems 
5.1 Legislation 
The current Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas 
Transmission Systems (10) (CAM NC) was approved on 16 March 2017 and 
entered into force on 6 April 2017. The following deadlines are specified in the 
Code: 
— 31 December 2018: when Transmission System Operators (TSOs) have to 
submit to ENTSOG all information required by ENTSOG to comply with its 
obligations pursuant to paragraph 1 (Article 38.2) 
— 31 March 2019: when ENTSOG has to submit to ACER the above information, 
after having monitored and analysed how TSOs have implemented this Code, 
ensuring the completeness and correctness of all relevant information (Article 
38.1). 
— 6 April 2019: when ACER has to report on the conditionalities stipulated in 
contracts for standard capacity products for firm capacity, having regard to 
their effect on efficient network use and the integration of the Union gas 
markets (Article 38.4). 
The repealed CAM NC (11) was approved on 14 October 2013, entered into force 
on 4 November 2013, and was applied from 1 November 2015. It was valid until 
5 April 2017. 
5.2 Overview of the Code 
 Scope 5.2.1
The CAM NC establishes capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission 
systems for existing and incremental capacity (12). It applies to Interconnection 
Points (13) (IPs), and may apply to entry points from and exit points to third 
countries, subject to the decision of the relevant National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA). It does not apply to exit points to end consumers and distribution 
networks, entry points from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals and 
production facilities, and entry points from or exit points to storage facilities. The 
CAM NC applies to technical capacity (14), interruptible capacity (15), additional 
                                           
(10)  REGULATION (EU) 2017/459 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on capacity allocation 
mechanisms in gas transmission systems and repealing Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R0459). 
(11)  REGULATION (EU) No 984/2013 of 14 October 2013 establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation 
Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and supplementing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0984). 
(12)  Α possible future increase via market-based procedures in technical capacity or possible new capacity 
created where none currently exists that may be offered based on investment in physical infrastructure or 
long-term capacity optimisation and subsequently allocated subject to the positive outcome of an economic 
test. 
(13)  Α physical or virtual point connecting adjacent entry-exit systems or connecting an entry-exit system with 
an interconnector, in so far as these points are subject to booking procedures by network users. 
(14)  The maximum firm capacity that the transmission system operator can offer to the network users, taking 
account of system integrity and the operational requirements of the transmission network. 
(15)  Gas transmission capacity that may be interrupted by the transmission system operator in accordance with 
the conditions stipulated in the transport contract. 
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capacity (16), and incremental capacity, and sets up an auction procedure for 
capacity allocation where standard capacity products (17) are used (alternative 
capacity allocation mechanisms (18) may be used for incremental capacity). In 
addition, NRAs may limit up-front bidding by any single network user (19). 
 Cooperation 5.2.2
The CAM NC promotes cooperation and coordination between adjacent TSOs in 
terms of maintenance and information systems, including access of users to 
auction systems or booking platforms.  
The maximum technical capacity shall be made available to network users, 
taking into account system integrity, safety and efficient network operation. 
Adjacent TSOs shall establish a joint method for optimisation of capacity, and 
perform in depth analysis taking into consideration the Union-wide TYNDP, 
national investment plans, and competing capacities (20).  
A dynamic approach to recalculation of capacity is prescribed, where the TSOs 
decide on the frequency of the recalculation. 
Where optimisation causes costs to TSOs, recovery is allowable via the 
regulatory framework. 
Adjacent TSOs shall exchange nomination (21), re-nomination (22), matching, and 
confirmation information at IPs. 
 Allocation of Firm Capacity Products 5.2.3
Auctions shall be used for the allocation of firm capacity (23) products, except 
where alternative allocation mechanisms for incremental capacity are used. All 
IPs shall have the same auction design, all auctions shall start simultaneously, 
and standard capacity products shall be used, from long to short duration 
(yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily and within-day standard capacity products), 
both bundled (24) and unbundled. Allocation shall be independent, except for 
incremental capacity and competing capacity.  
The units used shall be kWh/h or kWh/d (flat flow rate assumed).  
The CAM NC defines that 20% of the existing technical capacity shall be set aside 
and offered as shown in  
                                           
(16)  Any additional capacity made available through the application of one of the congestion-management 
procedures as provided for in points 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 of Annex I of REGULATION (EC) No 
715/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access 
to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02009R0715-20150525). 
(17)  A certain amount of transport capacity over a given period of time, at a specified interconnection point. 
(18)  An allocation mechanism for offer level or incremental capacity designed on a case-by-case basis by the 
transmission system operators, and approved by the national regulatory authorities, to accommodate 
conditional demand requests. 
(19)  A customer or a potential customer of a transmission system operator, and transmission system operators 
themselves in so far as it is necessary for them to carry out their functions in relation to transmission. 
(20)  Capacities for which the available capacity at one point of the network cannot be allocated without fully or 
partly reducing the available capacity at another point of the network. 
(21)  The prior reporting by the network user to the transmission system operator of the actual flow that the 
network user wishes to inject into or withdraw from the system. 
(22)  The subsequent reporting of a corrected nomination. 
(23)  Gas transmission capacity contractually guaranteed as uninterruptible by the transmission system 
operator. 
(24)  A standard capacity product offered on a firm basis which consists of corresponding entry and exit capacity 
at both sides of every interconnection point. 
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Figure 23. 
Figure 23. Allocation of 20% of the existing technical capacity 
 
Source: Enagas (25) 
The capacity auctions shall have the following specifications: 
5.2.3.1 Annual yearly auction 
— Gas year: starting 1 October 
— Auctions held once a year, on the 1st Monday of July, unless otherwise 
specified in the auction calendar (26) 
— Between 8.00 to 17.00 UTC (27) (winter) or 7.00 to 16.00 UTC (summer) 
— Minimum 5 years, maximum 15 years, for incremental maximum 15 years 
after start of operation 
— Ascending clock auction algorithm 
— Bundled or unbundled capacity 
— Users informed about amount of firm capacity available at least 1 month 
before auction starts 
— Allocation results made available no later than the next business day after 
closing, simultaneously to all participants 
                                           
(25)  Enagás Integration with European Regulation (November 2013) 
(http://www.enagas.es/stfls/EnagasImport/Ficheros/373/762/Integration%20with%20European%20Regul
ation,0.pdf). 
(26)  A table displaying information relating to specific auctions which is published by ENTSOG by January of 
every calendar year for auctions taking place during the period of March until February of the following 
calendar year and consisting of all relevant timings for auctions, including starting dates and standard 
capacity products to which they apply. 
(27)  Coordinated Universal Time. 
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— For incremental capacity, results made available no later than the next 
business day, economic results shall be made available no later than 2 
business days after closing 
— Aggregated information to the market 
5.2.3.2 Annual quarterly auction 
— Gas quarters: starting 1 October, 1 January, 1 April, 1 July 
— Auctions held four times a year: 
 On the 1st Monday of August for quarters 1 to 4, 
 On the 1st Monday of November for quarters 2 to 4, 
 On the 1st Monday of February for quarters 3 and 4, 
 On the 1st Monday of May for quarter 4, 
unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar 
— Between 8.00 to 17.00 UTC (winter) or 7.00 to 16.00 UTC (summer) 
— Ascending clock auction algorithm 
— Bundled or unbundled capacity 
— Users informed about amount of firm capacity available 2 weeks before each 
quarterly auction starts 
— Allocation results made available no later than the next business day after 
closing, simultaneously to all participants 
— Aggregated information to the market 
5.2.3.3 Rolling monthly auction 
— Gas months: calendar months 
— Auctions held every month, on the 3rd Monday of the month, allocating 
capacity for the following month, unless otherwise specified in the auction 
calendar 
— Between 8.00 to 17.00 UTC (winter) or 7.00 to 16.00 UTC (summer) 
— Ascending clock auction algorithm 
— Bundled or unbundled capacity 
— Users informed about amount of firm capacity available 1 week before each 
monthly auction starts 
— Allocation results made available no later than the next business day after 
closing, simultaneously to all participants 
— Aggregated information to the market 
5.2.3.4 Rolling day-ahead auction 
— Gas day: from 5.00 to 5.00 UTC the following day (winter) or from 4.00 to 
4.00 UTC the following day (summer) 
— Auctions held once a day. 
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— Between 15.30 to 16.00 UTC (winter) or 14.30 to 15.00 UTC (summer), 
allocating capacity for the following gas day 
— Uniform-price auction algorithm 
— Bundled or unbundled capacity 
— Users informed about amount of firm capacity available at the time the 
bidding round opens 
— Allocation results made available no later than 30 minutes after closing, 
simultaneously to all participants 
— Aggregated information to the market 
5.2.3.5 Within-day auction 
— Subject to capacity being made available 
— Auctions held every hour during the gas day. 
— First bidding round opens on the next hour following the publications of 
results of the last day-ahead auction (including interruptible capacity) 
— First bidding round closes at 1.30 UTC (winter) or 0.30 UTC (summer) 
— Allocation effective from 5.00 UTC (winter) or 4.00 UTC (summer) 
— Network users can place, withdraw, amend bids before closure of bidding 
round 
— Each hour, capacity for +4 hours is allocated 
— Duration of each bidding round is 30 minutes 
— Uniform-price auction algorithm 
— Bundled or unbundled capacity 
— Users informed about amount of firm within-day capacity available after the 
end of the day-ahead auction 
— Users with unsuccessful day-ahead bids can have the option to have them 
entered automatically in the subsequent within-day auction 
— Allocation results made available within 30 minutes of closure of bidding 
round 
— Aggregated information to the market at least at the end of the day 
The two auction algorithms defined in the CAM NC are the ascending clock 
auction algorithm (28) and the uniform-price auction algorithm (29). Their 
characteristics are: 
5.2.3.6 Ascending clock auction algorithm 
— Volume bids against escalating prices starting at the reserve price (30) 
— Duration of first round: 3 hours, duration of subsequent rounds: 1 hour 
                                           
(28)  An auction in which a network user places requested quantities against defined price steps, which are 
announced sequentially. 
(29)  An auction in which the network user in a single bidding round bids price as well as quantity and all 
network users, who are successful in gaining capacity, pay the price of the lowest successful bid. 
(30)  The eligible floor price in the auction. 
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— 1 hour gap between bidding rounds 
— Users wishing to participate must participate in the first round 
— Bids equal or smaller than the capacity offered in the specific auction 
— Subsequent bids equal or smaller than the initial bid 
— Bids may be entered, modified and withdrawn during a bidding round 
— A large price step and small price step are defined 
— Large price step and small price step shall be published in advance 
— Large price step is an integer number of small price steps 
— Large price step shall be selected to minimise the length of the auction 
— Small price step shall be selected to minimise unsold capacity 
— If aggregate demand is less than or equal to offered capacity at the end of 
the first round, the auction closes 
— If aggregate demand is greater than the offered capacity at the end of the 
first round or subsequent rounds, a further bidding round opens with price 
equal to the price in the previous round + large price step 
— If a first time undersell occurs, a further bidding round opens with price equal 
to the price in the round preceding the undersell + small price step 
— If the aggregate demand is greater than the offered capacity at the end of the 
first time undersell minus one small price step, the auction closes 
— The clearing price, fixed (31) or floating (32), is the price that led to the first 
undersell and successful bids are the successful bids of the first undersell 
— The aggregated demand of all users is published as soon as possible after 
each round 
— If auction has not ended by the start of the next auction, capacity will be 
offered in the next relevant auction 
An example of an ascending clock auction is shown in Figure 24. 
  
                                           
(31)  A price calculated in accordance with Article 24(b) of COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2017/460 of 16 
March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas where the 
reserve price is not subject to any adjustments. 
(32)  A price calculated in accordance with Article 24(a) of COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2017/460 of 16 
March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas where the 
reserve price is subject to adjustments such as revenue reconciliation, adjustment of the allowed revenue 
or adjustment of the forecasted contracted capacity. 
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Figure 24. Example of ascending clock auction 
 
Source: Enagas (25) 
5.2.3.7 Uniform-price auction algorithm 
— A single bidding round with price and quantity bids 
— Each network user can submit up to 10 bids 
— User specifies amount of capacity request + minimum amount of capacity 
willing to accept + bid price (equal or greater than reserve price) 
— TSOs rank the bids starting from the highest price 
— Pro rata allocation is used if two users have placed the same price bid and the 
unallocated capacity is less than the aggregated capacity requested by users 
— If unallocated capacity is less than minimum capacity a user is willing to 
accept then bid is not successful and next lower bid is considered 
— Clearing price is the price of the lowest successful bid, if demand exceeds 
offer 
— Clearing price is the reserve price, otherwise 
— Fixed payable price or floating payable price 
An example of an ascending clock auction is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Example of uniform price auction  
 
Source: Enagas (25) 
 Bundling of Capacity at Interconnection Points 5.2.4
The CAM NC specifies that adjacent TSOs shall jointly offer bundled capacity 
products. It is stressed that all firm capacity, as far as possible, shall be offered 
as bundled capacity on a booking platform with a single allocation procedure. If 
more firm capacity is available on one side of the IP, TSO of that side may offer 
that capacity as unbundled. However, the duration of contracts of unbundled 
capacity is limited (not exceeding the duration of unbundled capacity on the 
other side of the IP, otherwise one year). Unbundled capacity may be nominated 
as such and traded in the secondary market. A single nomination is envisaged for 
bundled products. Bundled capacity can only be resold as bundled. 
Virtual interconnection points (33) (VIPs) shall be established where there are two 
or more IPs between adjacent TSOs. VIPs shall be established before 1 
November 2018. 
The Code specifies that ENTSOG shall create a catalogue of main terms & 
conditions for bundled capacity before 6 January 2018 and publish a template 
within six months. ACER shall provide an opinion on the template within three 
months and ENTSOG shall publish the final template within three months. New 
bundled capacity products may use this template. 
Network users with unbundled products shall aim to bundle their capacity via 
contractual arrangements. TSOs shall offer a free-of-charge capacity conversion 
service of unmatched unbundled capacity from 1 January 2018 (with payment 
                                           
(33)  Two or more interconnection points which connect the same two adjacent entry-exit systems, integrated 
together for the purposes of providing a single capacity service. 
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limited to a possible auction premium for the part of the contracted bundled 
capacity which network users already hold as mismatched unbundled capacity). 
The capacity conversion shall be applicable to yearly, quarterly and monthly 
contracts and to users with existing unbundled capacity at one side of an IP and 
bundled capacity at the same IP. ENTSOG was tasked to issue the capacity 
conversion model by 1 October 2017. 
All capacity shall be bundled as early as possible and the duration of bundling 
arrangements cannot exceed the duration of original unbundled contract. 
Unbundled capacity contracts cannot be renewed. 
 Incremental Capacity Process 5.2.5
The incremental capacity process (34) includes an economic test (35) which is 
performed by the TSO or the NRA for each offer level (36) of an incremental 
capacity project after binding commitments of network users for contracting 
capacity. The following parameters are used: 
— Present Value (PV) of binding commitments of network users for contracting 
capacity 
— PV of estimated increase in the allowed revenue (37) or target revenue (38) of 
the TSO 
— f-factor (39), as defined by NRAs 
The incremental capacity project is initiated when the economic test is positive in 
both sides for at least one offer level. Investment costs are reflected in an 
increase in the allowed or target revenues. 
The CAM NC specifies a single economic test by the involved TSOs of an IP in 
order to facilitate the offer of bundled capacity products. In this case, 
redistribution of revenues between TSOs is possible under certain conditions. 
In terms of publication requirements, the TSOs seek approval by the NRAs for all 
economic test data used (reference prices estimated for the time horizon of the 
initial offer of incremental capacity used in the calculation of the PV of binding 
commitments of network users, PV of estimated increase in the allowed revenue 
or target revenue, f-factor, the range of the level for the mandatory minimum 
                                           
(34) A process to assess the market demand for incremental capacity that includes a non-binding phase, in 
which network users express and quantify their demand for incremental capacity, and a binding phase, in 
which binding commitments for contracting capacity are requested from network users by one or more 
transmission system operators. 
(35)  A test applied to assess the economic viability of incremental capacity projects. 
(36)  The sum of the available capacity and the respective level of incremental capacity offered for each of the 
yearly standard capacity products at an interconnection point. 
(37)  The sum of transmission services revenue and non-transmission services revenue for the provision of 
services by the transmission system operator for a specific time period within a given regulatory period 
which such transmission system operator is entitled to obtain under a non-price cap regime and which is 
set in accordance with Article 41(6)(a) of Directive 2009/73/EC. 
(38)  The sum of expected transmission services revenue calculated in accordance with the principles set out in 
Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and expected non-transmission services revenue for the 
provision of services by the transmission system operator for a specific time period within a given 
regulatory period under a price cap regime. 
(39)  The share of the present value of the estimated increase in the allowed or target revenue of the 
transmission system operator associated with the incremental capacity included in the respective offer level 
as set out in Article 22(1)(b) to be covered by the present value of binding commitments of network users 
for contracting capacity calculated as set out in Article 22(1)(a). 
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premium (40) for each offer level and IP applied in the first auction and possibly 
in subsequent auctions in which the incremental capacity is offered). 
A market demand assessment shall be performed at least in each odd year by 
TSOs after the start of the annual yearly auctions taking into consideration non-
binding demand indications by network users. The resulting market demand 
assessment report shall take into account the following criteria: 
— Whether no yearly standard capacity is available for the year during which the 
incremental capacity can become available and for the three following years. 
— Whether the Union-wide TYNDP identifies a gap and the incremental capacity 
project could close this gas. 
— Whether a national Network Development Plan (NDP) identifies a transport 
requirement. 
— Whether network users submitted non-binding requests for a sustained 
number of years. 
The design phase starts immediately after the market demand assessment report 
is published and if the report concludes that there is demand for the incremental 
capacity. Technical studies shall identify the coordinated offer levels based on the 
report and the technical feasibility of the project. During the design phase, the 
relevant TSOs shall conduct a joint public consultation and shall coordinate 
accordingly in order to, amongst others, offer the incremental capacity as 
bundled products.  
After the design phase is finalised and the joint public consultation is complete, 
the project proposal shall be sent to the relevant NRAs for coordinated approvals 
and, eventually, coordinated decisions. In case no agreement is reached by the 
NRAs on the proposed alternative allocation mechanism, ACER shall decide. 
The TSOs offer the incremental capacity together with available capacity, as 
standard bundled products, in the annual yearly capacity auction. Auctions for 
different offer levels are conducted in parallel and independently. A new auction 
may be initiated if required. 
An alternative allocation mechanism is possible covering maximum 15 years 
(may exceptionally be extended to 20 years). It can be used when: 
— The ascending clock auction is deemed to be unsuitable 
— If more than two entry-exit systems are involved  
— If bids with duration of more than one year are requested 
When an alternative allocation mechanism is used, conditional binding bids and 
prioritisation of booking duration or higher amounts of capacity may be possible. 
If prioritisation is applied, 10-20% of capacity may be set aside, decided by the 
NRAs. 
Requirements apply to existing incremental capacity projects unless approval for 
capacity allocation was granted by NRAs before 1 August 2017. 
                                           
(40)  Article 33(4) of COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code 
on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R0460) 
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An overview of the timeframe of the incremental capacity process can be seen in 
Figure 26. 
Figure 26. The incremental capacity process  
 
Source: GAZ-SYSTEM (41) 
 Interruptible Capacity 5.2.6
Starting from 1 January 2018, TSOs may offer interruptible capacity products 
longer than 1 day only if monthly, quarterly or yearly standard products for firm 
capacity were sold at auction premium, sold out or not offered. Daily 
interruptible products shall be offered in both directions if firm capacity was sold 
out day-ahead or not offered. Daily interruptible products shall be offered at 
least in opposite direction for unidirectional IPs. 
Interruptible capacity shall be offered in auctions after firm capacity of the same 
duration has been offered, with the exception of within-day capacity where an 
over-nomination procedure (42) shall be used. For the annual yearly, for all 
annual quarterly and for all rolling monthly capacity auctions, network users shall 
be notified 1 week before the auction starts about the amount of interruptible 
capacity to be offered. 
The minimum interruption lead times are decided by the TSOs, with the default 
minimum time being 45 minutes after the start of the re-nomination cycle for 
that gas hour. Interruptions are coordinated between TSOs. 
The contractual time stamp shall be used in order to determine which 
interruptions shall take place when the total nominations exceed the capacity of 
an IP. Pro rata reduction is applied when two or more nominations have the 
same ranking. The reasons of interruption are included in the contract directly or 
in the general terms and conditions which are applicable to the contract. 
 Capacity Booking Platforms 5.2.7
The CAM NC prescribes that the TSOs shall offer one or a limited number of web-
based booking platforms for capacity booking. Booking platforms shall: 
                                           
(41)  GAZ-SYSTEM Amended network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems 
(http://en.gaz-system.pl/fileadmin/pliki/do_pobrania/JoMil/ENG_NEW_CAM_NC_information_brochure.pdf) 
(42)  The entitlement of network users who fulfil minimum requirements for submitting nominations to request 
interruptible capacity at any time within-day by submitting a nomination which increases the total of their 
nominations to a level higher than their contracted capacity. 
 72 
— Comply with the rules for offer and allocation of firm capacity in the CAM NC 
— Offer firm bundled capacity as prescribed in the CAM NC 
— Include functionality for secondary capacity 
In addition, only users that comply with the requirements of the relevant TSOs 
shall be able to use the corresponding booking platform. Furthermore, capacity 
at any IP or VIP shall be offered in one booking platform. 
The relevant TSOs of an IP or VIP shall reach agreement on the booking platform 
to be used within 6 months from entry into force of this Code. If this does not 
happen, NRAs shall assign within 6 months a booking platform for maximum 3 
years. If the NRAs don't reach an agreement within 6 months, ACER shall decide 
on the booking platform to be used for maximum 3 years. ENTSOG and ACER 
may facilitate the process of booking platform selection. 
5.3 Differences between the Current and the Repealed CAM NC 
The current CAM NC introduces or modifies the following: 
— Minimum number of gas years for which the TSO may offer existing capacity: 
5 years (there was no minimum before) 
— Date of annual yearly capacity auctions: 1st Monday of July (was 1st Monday 
of March) 
— Number and dates of annual quarterly capacity auctions: 4 auction on the 1st 
Monday of August, November, February, and May (there was one auction on 
the 1st Monday of June only) 
— Interruptible capacity for annual, quarterly, and monthly products may only 
be offered after the corresponding annual, quarterly, and monthly firm 
product was sold at an auction premium, was sold out, or was not offered 
— Standardisation of the way market participants can indicate demand for 
incremental capacity 
— Standardisation of the rules of incremental capacity allocation by offering it 
together with the existing capacity 
— Standardisation of the process of determining economic viability of an 
investment 
— Establishment of cooperation between TSOs, NRAs, and market participants 
within the regular incremental process 
— Article on tariffs removed and references to Regulation (EU) 2017/460 added. 
5.4 Status of Implementation 
 Booking Platforms 5.4.1
As of January 2017, all relevant TSOs are connected to a booking platform (43). 
The only exception is the IP of Amber Grid (LT), which is the only IP of a TSO 
whose country has derogation. 
                                           
(43)  ENTSOG CAM NC Implementation Monitoring Report 2016 (13 June 2017) 
(https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Implementation%20Monitoring/2017/l_entsog_I
MR_cam_2016_03.pdf) 
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At the moment, there are three booking platforms (44) where standard 
procedures described in the CAM NC are used:  
— PRISMA (https://platform.prisma-capacity.eu/#/start) 
 Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, 
Ireland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Austria, Italy, Slovenia 
— GSA (https://aukcje.gaz-system.pl/) 
 Polish sides of the IPs and at the interconnection point between Poland and 
the Czech Republic 
— RBP (https://rbp.eu/) 
 Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece 
It has to be noted that there are two IPs without agreement on booking platform 
at the German-Polish border (43). 
Figure 27. Capacity booking platforms in the EU 
 
Source: ENTSOG (43) 
                                           
(44)  ACER/CEER Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Gas Markets in 2016 - 
Gas Wholesale Markets Volume (6 October 2017) 
(http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Market%20Mon
itoring%20Report%202016%20-%20GAS.pdf) 
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 Compliance 5.4.2
From the survey conducted by ENTSOG, there are 41 TSOs that are required to 
apply the CAM NC. From these (43): 
— 32 TSOs fully comply with the CAM NC (applying all or at least all mandatory 
requirements) 
— 9 TSOs claim that they partially comply to the CAM NC  
— the Member States of 5 TSOs have derogations (one TSO of which voluntary 
partially implemented the CAM NC) 
— 3 TSOs have IPs that are not relevant to the CAM NC 
There are 328 IP sides in the European Energy Market. From these (43): 
— For 37 IP sides the application of the CAM NC is not mandatory (35 with non-
EU countries, 2 with derogation) 
— For 4 IP sides there is an exemption from the national Energy Act 
Standard capacity products have been introduced in all relevant IP sides. 
However, there are some delays in implementation of CAM NC provisions still 
present. Application of the CAM NC is not possible in some IPs as technical 
capacity is already booked on a long term basis. 
The latest list of IPs published by ENTSOG/ACER (45) provides a best assessment 
of the entry and exit IP sides where the CAM NC is applicable. 
According to ACER (46), following surveys in the first quarter of 2016, the overall 
average level of implementation of the NC CAM, with all mandatory NC CAM 
provisions weighted evenly, is 82%, which is deemed to be a good level of 
implementation. On the other hand, the average level of implementation of the 
core requirements of the CAM NC, i.e. auctioning of standard products via 
booking platforms, is 94%, which is deemed to be a high level of 
implementation. 
The implementation of the following prescriptions of the CAM NC is lagging 
behind: 
— capacity bundling, so that network users can easily access IP capacity using a 
single nomination procedure,  
— VIPs, so that booking is further simplified for network users, and  
— capacity maximisation, where NRAs are not involved in the joint calculation 
method for removal of mismatches at the two sides or an IP, the TSOs have 
not agreed on the frequency of the dynamic recalculation, and the TSOs don't 
make use of network user data of future flows. 
Overall, ACER stresses that the dynamic recalculation of technical capacity needs 
to be improved. 
                                           
(45)  ENTSOG/ACER List of Interconnection Points defining the scope of the CAM Network Code and CMP 
Guidelines (20 June 2016) 
(https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Implementation%20Monitoring/2016/CAP0657-
16_CAM%20ANNEX%20II%20IP%20list%20with%20products%20march%202016_final.xlsx) 
(46)  ACER Implementation Monitoring Report on the Capacity Allocation Mechanisms Network Code (27 October 
2016) 
(http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/Implementation_Monitori
ng_Report_on_the_Capacity_Allocation_Mechanisms_Network_Code.pdf) 
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It has to be noted that all implementation assessments are based on the 
repealed CAM NC (11) rather than on the current CAM NC (10). 
 Capacity Conversion Model 5.4.3
ENTSOG issued the capacity conversion model on 24 July 2017 (47) (the deadline 
in the CAM NC was 1 October 2017), with the service being offered from 1 
January 2018. 
Requests for capacity conversion are submitted by network users that hold 
unbundled capacity, before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the respective auction for 
bundled capacity, in accordance with the relevant contractual arrangements. The 
TSO performs the conversion subject to the allocation of bundled capacity to the 
network user. The capacity that becomes available after the conversion is offered 
in the subsequent auctions by the relevant TSO. 
A network user may request a conversion up to the capacity and up to the 
duration of its unbundled capacity contract. 
Figure 28 provides a diagrammatic representation of the capacity conversion 
problem, where the available bundled capacity is shown in relation to the 
unbundled capacity already held by a network user. 
Figure 28. Capacity conversion problem 
 
Source: ENTSOG (47) 
  
                                           
(47)  ENTSOG’s Capacity conversion model - CAP0717-17 (24 July 2017) 
(https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/CAM%20Network%20Code/2017/CAP0717-
17_170724_ENTSOG_Capacity-conversion-model_final%20GA.pdf) 
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 Effect 5.4.4
The ratio of bundled capacity to sold capacity for the 2015/2016 gas year, as 
calculated by ENTSOG (43), is shown in Figure 29.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ENTSOG (43) 
Overall, about 33% of the total firm capacity booked was booked as part of a 
bundled product. 
The significant difference between the quarterly products and the yearly, 
monthly and daily products can be attributed to the date and frequency of the 
annual quarterly capacity auctions in the repealed CAM NC, as described in 
paragraph 5.3, both of which are modified in the current CAM NC (48). 
The relative low ratios can be explained as follows: 
— The NRA decided to apply the CAM NC to an IP even though it is not 
necessary (i.e. IP with third country or IP with an exempted country) 
— There are still significantly many old long-term unbundled capacity contracts 
which can only be matched with unbundled capacity on the other side of the 
IP 
— There are differences in technical capacities of IP sides resulting in capacities 
being offered as unbundled 
— There are different booking platforms on IP sides 
— There are network users that are matching unbundled capacity on one IP side 
with interruptible capacity on the other IP side. 
                                           
(48)  ENTSOG Auction Calendar 2017/2018 for Capacity Allocation Mechanism Network Code - CAP0682-16 (7 
October 2016) 
(https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/CAM%20Network%20Code/2016/CAP0682_1610
07_CAM%20NC%20auction%20calendar%202017-2018.pdf) 
Figure 29. Bundled capacity to sold capacity 
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— The NRA decided to apply the CAM NC to an IP side although that side is 
connected to a Distribution System Operator (DSO) 
Figure 30 shows the reasons why TSOs were offering unbundled capacity instead 
of bundled capacity. 
Figure 30. Reasoning for offering unbundled capacity 
 
Source: ENTSOG (43) 
In addition to the ratio of bundled capacity to sold capacity, ENTSOG has also 
calculated the ratio of bundled capacity to firm capacity in the secondary market, 
which is only 0.38% (43). Main reason for this is the fact that the CAM NC 
entered into force in 2015 and before its entry in force, contracts were 
unbundled (normally, capacity in the secondary market comes from old 
contract).  
Furthermore, ENTSOG recorded the number of participants and the number of 
active participants in the 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 gas years (43), as shown in 
Figure 31. It is evident that both the number of participants and, more 
importantly, the number of active participants has increased, confirming that 
indeed the CAM NC facilitates access of network users to different European 
markets. 
Figure 31. Number of participants and number of active participants 
 
Source: ENTSOG (43) 
ACER and CEER have also been assessing the market effects of the CAM NC (44). 
In terms of bundled capacity products, it is observed that on average only 1% of 
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the capacity offered as bundled in the PRISMA booking platform was booked, as 
shown in Figure 32. This is attributed to the following: 
— the current market conditions at the majority of IP sides, where 
transportation costs are higher than spreads, resulting in reduced interest for 
engagement in price arbitrage between hubs 
— the bundled and unbundled capacity mismatch, which is though likely to be 
resolved with the introduction of ENTSOG’s Capacity conversion model (47) 
— the lack or insufficient transparency in the calculation of technical capacity by 
TSOs  
— the lack of standardised capacity products at some borders 
— the high shares of long-term capacity bookings not fully utilised. 
Figure 32. Bundled capacity offered and sold in PRISMA 
 
Source: ACER/CEER (44) 
The average booking ratio of IP sides in 2016, as shown in Figure 33, was 60%, 
with all hub types having similar average booking ratios. However, results vary 
significantly when looking into individual IP sides, as demonstrated in Figure 34. 
It is notable that IP sides located in important routes are almost fully booked.  
The high booking levels at certain IP sides can be explained by high levels of 
long-term capacity booked years ago, when the market conditions were more 
favourable. Low booking levels reveal lower interest and lower attractiveness of 
the specific route. In partially booked IP sides, the uncertainty over the capacity 
tariffs and the frequent changes in transportation tariffs contribute to the 
relatively low booking levels.  
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Figure 33. Average ratio of booked firm capacity to technical capacity / average utilisation in 2016 
per hub type 
 
Source: ACER/CEER (44) 
Figure 34. Average ratio of booked firm capacity to technical capacity in 2016 in selected IP sides 
 
Source: ACER/CEER (44) 
Although peak capacity needs to be taken into consideration when determining 
the required technical capacity, ACER and CEER note that, as contractual 
congestion is registered only at 9% of EU IP sides, a situation of overcapacity in 
parts of the gas network is quite likely in the near future.  
Finally, it is interesting to note the following statement in the ACER/CEER Report: 
"In general, the issues with the network codes and framework guidelines 
implementation, experienced by market participants and reported in the ‘Barriers 
in gas wholesale markets survey’ (49), relate mainly to the differences between 
present day gas market conditions (‘oversupply’ and ’sizeable unused capacity’) 
                                           
(49)  ACER Barriers to gas wholesale trading (February 2017) 
(http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Market%20monitoring/Documents_Public/Kantor_report_on%20
barriers%20to%20gas%20wholesale%20trading.pdf) 
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and those at the time of their drafting (‘golden age of gas’, scarcity of 
transportation capacity)". 
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6 Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff 
Structures for Gas 
This chapter is based on the text of the Network Code on Harmonised 
Transmission Tariff Structures for Gas (50) and on ENTSOG's implementation 
document (51). The TAR NC is the fourth network code in the gas sector, 
following the NCs on capacity allocation mechanisms, gas balancing of 
transmission and interoperability and data exchange rules.  
The TAR NC interacts with: 
— Amended CAM NC: certain rules of the TAR NC refer specifically to 
Interconnection points (‘IP’), subject to the Amended CAM NC. The listed 
rules in the TAR NC address tariff-related issues of the Amended CAM NC: 
Chapter III ‘Reserve prices’, Chapter V ‘Pricing of bundled capacity and 
capacity at virtual interconnection points (‘VIP’)’, Chapter VI ‘Clearing and 
payable price’, Article 28 on discounts, multipliers and seasonal factors from 
Chapter VII ‘Consultation requirements’, Article 31(2)–(3) on publication of 
certain tariff information on ENTSOG’s Transparency Platform (‘TP’) from 
Chapter VIII ‘Publication requirements’ and Chapter IX ‘Incremental capacity’. 
The Amended CAM NC governs the process for offering incremental capacity, 
while the TAR NC sets out the tariff principles for incremental capacity. 
— Transparency Guidelines: Chapter VIII ‘Publication requirements’ sets out 
tariff transparency obligations that further elaborate and harmonise the tariff 
transparency obligations in the Transparency Guidelines. 
— BAL NC: the TAR NC treats the balancing activity of a TSO as a ‘third’ service 
category independent of transmission and non-transmission services. 
Balancing costs receive separate treatment given the application of a 
neutrality mechanism under the BAL NC. 
— INT NC: the TAR NC incorporates all the definitions introduced by the INT NC. 
— Chapter 2.2 of Annex I to the Gas Regulation (‘CMP Guidelines’): although the 
Gas Regulation defines physical and contractual congestion, there is an 
indirect link between the TAR NC and the CMP Guidelines. The CMP Guidelines 
stipulate the detailed measures for solving contractual congestion, which can 
affect the TSO’s revenue recovery, as when implementing an oversubscription 
and buy-back procedure. 
6.1 Legislation 
The current the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for 
Gas (TAR NC) was approved on 16 March 2017, published in the Official Journal 
on 17 March 2017 and entered into force on 6 April 2017. Some deadlines are 
specified, among which 31 May 2019 which is the deadline when the procedure 
consisting of the final consultation on the reference price methodology in 
                                           
(50)  REGULATION (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised transmission 
tariff structures for gas (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
+content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0460&from=EN) 
(51) Implementation Document for the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for Gas - 
Second Edition 
(https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Tariffs/2017/TAR1000_170928_2nd%20Impleme
ntation%20Document_High-Res.pdf) 
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accordance with Article 26, the decision by the national regulatory authority in 
accordance with paragraph 4 (Article 27), the calculation of tariffs on the basis of 
this decision, and the publication of the tariffs in accordance with Chapter VIII 
shall be concluded. The procedure shall be repeated at least every five years 
starting from the deadline.  
The TAR NC sets out the rules on harmonised transmission tariff structures for 
gas, including rules on the application of a reference price methodology, the 
associated consultation and publication requirements as well as the calculation of 
reserve prices for standard capacity products. 
6.2 Scope 
The TAR NC apply to all entry and exit points of gas transmission networks 
except Chapters III (Reserve prices) , V (Pricing of bundled capacity and capacity 
at VIPs), VI (Clearing and payable price), Chapter IX (Incremental capacity), 
Article 28 in Chapter VII (Consultation requirements) on NRA consultation on 
discounts, multipliers and seasonal factors, Article 31(2)-(3) in Chapter VIII 
(Publication requirements) on the publication of certain tariff information on the 
ENTSOG’s Transparency Platform (TP), which apply only to IPs.  
For non-IPs, there are two categories:  
— non-IPs that are entry-points-from/exit-points-to third countries 
— other non-IPs, such as domestic exit points, entry-points-from/exit-points-to 
storage facilities. Such a distinction is necessary when analysing which TAR 
NC rules that are by default limited 
to IPs can be extended to non-IPs. If the NRA takes the decision to apply the 
CAM NC to entry or/and exit points from/to third countries, then Chapters III, V, 
VI, Article 28 and Chapter IX shall also apply to those points. 
Derogations limited in time exist for certain MS, under Article 49 of Directive 
2009/73/EC. 
6.3 Definitions 
The definitions in the Gas Directive (52), the Gas Regulation, the BAL NC (53), the 
INT NC (54) and the CAM NC (55) shall also apply for the TAR NC. 
In addition, the following definitions are directly given in Article 3: 
‘reference price’ means the price for a capacity product for firm capacity with a 
duration of one year, which is applicable at entry and exit points and which is 
used to set capacity-based transmission tariffs;  
                                           
(52)  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0073) 
(53)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 312 / 2014 of 26 March 2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas 
Balancing of Transmission Networks  
(54)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2015 / 703 of 30 April 2015 establishing a network code on interoperability 
and data exchange rules 
(55) CAM 
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‘reference price methodology’ (RPM) means the methodology applied to the 
part of the transmission services revenue to be recovered from capacity-based 
transmission tariffs with the aim of deriving reference prices;  
‘non-price cap regime’ means a regulatory regime, such as the revenue cap, 
rate of return and cost plus regime, under which the allowed revenue for the 
transmission system operator is set in accordance with Article 41(6)(a) of 
Directive 2009/73/EC;  
‘non-transmission services revenue’ means the part of the allowed or target 
revenue which is recovered by non- transmission tariffs;  
‘regulatory period’ means the time period for which the general rules for the 
allowed or target revenue are set in accordance with Article 41(6)(a) of Directive 
2009/73/EC;  
‘transmission services revenue’ means the part of the allowed or target 
revenue which is recovered by transmission tariffs;  
‘transmission tariffs’ means the charges payable by network users for 
transmission services provided to them;  
‘intra-system network use’ means transporting gas within an entry-exit 
system to customers connected to that same entry-exit system;  
‘cross-system network use’ means transporting gas within an entry-exit 
system to customers connected to another entry-exit system;  
‘homogeneous group of points’ means a group of one of the following types 
of points: entry interconnection points, exit interconnection points, domestic 
entry points, domestic exit points, entry points from storage facilities, exit points 
to storage facilities, entry points from liquefied natural gas facilities (hereinafter, 
referred to as ‘LNG facilities’), exit points to LNG facilities and entry points from 
production facilities; 
‘allowed revenue’ means the sum of transmission services revenue and non-
transmission services revenue for the provision of services by the transmission 
system operator for a specific time period within a given regulatory period which 
such transmission system operator is entitled to obtain under a non-price cap 
regime and which is set in accordance with Article 41(6)(a) of Directive 
2009/73/EC;  
‘transmission services’ means the regulated services that are provided by the 
transmission system operator within the entry-exit system for the purpose of 
transmission;  
‘non-transmission tariffs’ means the charges payable by network users for 
non-transmission services provided to them;  
‘target revenue’ means the sum of expected transmission services revenue 
calculated in accordance with the principles set out in Article 13(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 715/2009 and expected non-transmission services revenue for the 
provision of services by the transmission system operator for a specific time 
period within a given regulatory period under a price cap regime;  
‘non-transmission services’ means the regulated services other than 
transmission services and other than services regulated by Regulation (EU) No 
312/2014 that are provided by the transmission system operator;  
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‘multiplier’ means the factor applied to the respective proportion of the 
reference price in order to calculate the reserve price for a non-yearly standard 
capacity product;  
‘price cap regime’ means a regulatory regime under which a maximum 
transmission tariff based on the target revenue is set in accordance with Article 
41(6)(a) of Directive 2009/73/EC;  
‘cost driver’ means a key determinant of the transmission system operator's 
activity which is correlated to the costs of that transmission system operator, 
such as distance or technical capacity;  
‘cluster of entry or exit points’ means a homogeneous group of points or 
group of entry points or of exit points located within the vicinity of each other 
and which are considered as, respectively, one entry point or one exit point for 
the application of the reference price methodology;  
‘flow scenario’ means a combination of an entry point and an exit point which 
reflects the use of the transmission system according to likely supply and 
demand patterns and for which there is at least one pipeline route allowing to 
flow gas into the transmission network at that entry point and out of the 
transmission network at that exit point, irrespective of whether the capacity is 
contracted at that entry point and that exit point; 
‘seasonal factor’ means the factor reflecting the variation of demand within the 
year which may be applied in combination with the relevant multiplier;  
‘fixed payable price’ means a price calculated in accordance with Article 24(b) 
where the reserve price is not subject to any adjustments;  
‘tariff period’ means the time period during which a particular level of reference 
price is applicable, which minimum duration is one year and maximum duration 
is the duration of the regulatory period;  
‘regulatory account’ means the account aggregating at least under- and over-
recovery of the transmission services revenue under a non-price cap regime; 
‘auction premium’ means the difference between the clearing price and the 
reserve price in an auction;  
‘floating payable price’ means a price calculated in accordance with Article 
24(a) where the reserve price is subject to adjustments such as revenue 
reconciliation, adjustment of the allowed revenue or adjustment of the forecasted 
contracted capacity. 
TAR NC splits all the regulatory regimes (defined in Article 41(6)(a) of the Gas 
Directive) into two categories: price cap and non-price cap. The main difference 
between the two is reflected in what is set:  
— either the maximum transmission tariff based on revenue for a price cap 
regime, leading to the concept of target revenue ; 
— or the revenue for a non-price cap regime; it is the concept of allowed 
revenue. 
As of September 2017, the majority of the EU TSOs function under the non-price 
cap regime. A combination of price cap and non-price cap regimes applies in the 
Czech Republic and Italy, and the price cap regime applies in Slovakia. 
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The regulatory periods are different in the MS. The same holds for the tariff 
periods. They are represented in Figure 35 and Figure 36. 
Figure 35. Regulatory periods in EU MS 
 
Figure 36. Tariff periods in EU MS 
 
 
6.4 Transmission and non-transmission services and tariffs 
The condition for a service to be considered a transmission service is to meet 
both of the following two criteria: 
Its costs are caused by the cost drivers of both technical or forecasted contracted 
capacity and distance. 
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Its costs are related to the investment in and operation of the infrastructure 
(which is part of the regulated asset base for the provision of such services). 
If a service does not meet both conditions, then it may be considered either a 
transmission or a non-transmission service, following the findings of the periodic 
consultations carried on by the NRA or TSO (and described in Articles 26 and 
27). 
The definition of the application of the tariffs and their link to the revenue is in 
Figure 37. 
Transmission tariffs may be set such as to take into account the conditions for 
firm capacity products. The transmission service revenue shall be recovered from 
transmission tariffs which are capacity-based transmission tariffs. 
Exceptions apply in the sense that part of the transmission services revenue may 
be recovered by commodity-based transmission tariffs satisfying: 
— flow-based charge,  
 levied for the purpose of covering the costs mainly driven by the quantity of 
the gas flow;  
 calculated on the basis of forecasted or historical flows, or both, and set in 
such a way that it is the same at all entry points and the same at all exit 
points;  
 expressed in monetary terms or in kind 
— a complementary revenue recovery charge, 
 levied for the purpose of managing revenue under- and over-recovery; 
 calculated on the basis of forecasted or historical capacity allocations and 
flows, or both;  
 applied at points other than interconnection points;  
 applied after the NRA has made an assessment of its cost-reflectivity and its 
impact on cross-subsidisation between IPs and points other than IPs.  
The non-transmission services revenue shall be recovered by non-transmission 
tariffs for a non-transmission service. Those tariffs shall be:  
— cost-reflective, non-discriminatory, objective and transparent;  
— charged to the beneficiaries of a non-transmission service with the aim of 
minimising cross-subsidisation between network users (within or outside a 
MS, or both).  
Where a given non-transmission service benefits all network users, its costs shall 
be recovered from all network users. 
Currently, there are many services offered by TSOs which must be assessed in 
the future against the TAR NC classification (transmission vs. non-transmission). 
Examples of such services are: 
— Blending and/or ballasting (e. g. Belgium, Italy); 
— Odourisation (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Romania); 
— Biogas services (e.g. France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania); 
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— Services provided on regional networks (e. g. France, Italy); 
— Dedicated compression services (e.g. France, Great Britain, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland); 
— Dedicated metering services (e.g. Belgium, Lithuania, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, France, Great Britain); 
— Dedicated pressure services (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania); 
— Dedicated connections (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania). 
Figure 37. Definition concerning revenue and tariffs 
 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
6.5 Cost allocation assessment 
 Cost allocation assessment method 6.5.1
The NRA or the TSO (as decided by the TSO) shall perform cost allocation 
assessments (and publish them as part of the final consultation defined in Article 
26) for:  
— Transmission services revenue recovered by capacity-based tariffs and based 
exclusively on cost-drivers of  
 technical or forecasted contracted capacity, or 
 technical or forecasted contracted capacity and distance; 
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— Transmission services revenue recovered by commodity-based tariffs and 
based exclusively on cost-drivers of 
 amount of gas flow or 
 amount of gas flow and distance. 
The intent of the cost allocation assessments is to guarantee against undue 
cross-subsidies on capacity or commodity by checking that the revenue-to-cost 
ratio for intra-system use is broadly similar to the revenue-to-cost ratio for 
cross-system use. 
Both cost allocation assessment for revenues recovered by capacity- and 
commodity-based tariffs shall be carried out using the formulae: 
𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐
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With the notations: 
𝛼 = {
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎  if intra − system network  
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  if cross − system network
,  
𝛽 = {
𝑐𝑎𝑝  if capacity − based  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚  if commodity − based
 , 
𝛼1 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎, 𝛼2 = 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠. 
The formulae are used in the following way.  
Let us suppose that we perform the cost allocation assessment for transmission 
services capacity-based revenue (which means that in both previous 
equations 𝛽 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝). We compute the intra-system capacity ratio (first equation 
with 𝛼 = 𝛼1) and the cross-system capacity ratio (first equation with 𝛼 = 𝛼2). Next 
we compute the capacity cost allocation comparison index between the two ratios 
using the second equation. This index is computed as ratio between a variability 
measure (here the range) and a measure of the average (here the mean).  
Moreover, there is a constraint on the cross-system network stating that the 
capacity use at all entry points is equal to the capacity use at all exit points and 
that the revenue is split based on this constraint. The revenue of the intra-
system network is equal to the difference between the overall revenue and the 
revenue from the cross-system. 
The 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 stands for the value of cost drivers for the system, such as the sum of 
the average forecasted capacities contracted at each entry/exit point (or cluster 
of points). It is measured in MWh/day. 
If this capacity cost allocation comparison index exceeds 10% (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝛽 > 10%), the 
NRA shall provide a justification in the decision referred to in Article 27(4). The 
same methodology is used for the cost allocation assessment for transmission 
services commodity-based revenue (𝛽 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚). 
The purpose of such calculations is to guarantee against undue cross-subsidies 
by checking that the revenue-to-cost ratio is approximatively the same for intra- 
and cross-system use. 
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 Cost allocation assessment example 6.5.2
Let us consider the following fictional example of a simple entry/exit system, 
schematically represented in 
Figure 38. 
Figure 38. Simple entry/exit system for the cost allocation example 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The system is formed by five points, two entry points, two exit points, and one 
point which is both entry and exit. The type of points and the capacities in 
GWh/d associated to the intra- and cross-systems are given in Table 14. 
Table 14. Capacities of the simple entry/exit system 
 Type Capacity 
(total) 
Capacity 
cross-
system 
Capacity 
intra-
system 
Capacity 
cross-
system 
Capacity 
intra-
system 
Entry       
A IP 500 500 x F 500 x (1-F) 143 357 
B IP 600 600 x F 600 x (1-F) 171 429 
C Production 300 300 x F 300 x (1-F) 86 214 
Exit      
B IP 200 200  
D IP 200 200  
E Consumption 1,000  1,000 
Source: own elaboration 
A way to compute the capacity use at all entry points of the cross-system from 
the constraint on the cross-system network (stating that the capacity use at all 
entry points is equal to the capacity use at all exit points) is to use the same 
factor F, as a multiplier for the capacity use at each entry point, which yields: 
𝐅 ∗  ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  
Here: 
𝐅 =
200 + 200
500 + 600 + 300
=
2
7
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To have a complete example, we should now define the distances between the 
points of the entry/exit points of the system and the total capacity revenue and 
well as the share of revenue for the entry points and the share of the revenue for 
the exit points. The Cost Drivers have to be computed too. 
Table 15. Distances (in km) between entries and exits 
 Exit 
B D E 
Entry 
A 550 300 250 
B 0 600 400 
C 350 200 400 
Taking into account the capacity and the distance of every entry of the system to 
one specific exit, a capacity weighted average distance can be calculated for this 
exit point. This average distance of one exit point is determined by the sum of 
each entry capacity, times the distance to this respective entry point from the 
considered exit point, divided by the sum of all entry capacities. An average 
distance for a specific exit point is hence: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑗
 
Same type of calculation of average distances for each entry point to the group 
of exit points is made. In contrast to exit points, for entry points there is a 
distinction regarding the average distance to intra-system exit points and to 
cross-system exit points. The distance to intra-system exit points is the actual 
distance to the exit point Consumption (E), while the distance to the cross-
system exit points is again calculated as the capacity weighted average between 
the cross-system exit points. This distinction is made to later define the 
intra/cross system drivers for entry points.  
In this example, the Driver for an exit point is the respective capacity at the 
point times the average distance to the entry points in this given system. The 
Drivers for each entry point are calculated by similarly. For entry points 
although, the Drivers will again be split and allocated to intra- and cross-system 
use. This is required for the assessment. 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖 
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Table 16. Average distances and drivers for entry and exit points 
Entry point Average distance for an entry point Drivers for entry points 
 To intra exits To cross exits Intra-use Cross-use 
A 250 425 89,250 60,775 
B 400 600 171,600 102,600 
C 400 300 85,600 25,800 
 
Exit point Average distance for an exit point Drivers for exit points 
B 475 95,000 
D 407 81,400 
E 346 346,000 
Let us assume that the total capacity revenue is of 500,000 € and that the 
entry/exit split is 40/60 % (decided arbitrarily). To complete the computation we 
also need the tariffs; we might set them arbitrarily (because this is not an 
example for tariffs derivation) for the exit and entry points. However, in this 
example, the only necessary one is the tariff for the consumption point (E), 
which allows computing the Exit revenues from Intra. We will set this tariff equal 
to 120 €.  
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Table 17. Cost allocation assessment 
Capacity revenue 500,000   
Entry share 40% 
Exit share 60% 
Entry revenues 200,000 
Exit revenues 300,000 
Entry revenues for Intra1 142,857 
Entry revenues for Cross2 57,143 
Exit revenues from Intra3 120 x 1,000= 
120,000 
Exit revenues from Cross 180,000  Test 
Revenue for Intra 262,857 Ratio intra  38% 
Revenue for Cross 237,143 Ratio cross 65% 
Cost Driver for Entry Intra 4 346,450 Comparison 
index 
26% 
Cost Driver for Exit Intra 346,000 Justification required  
Cost Driver for Intra5 692,450  
Cost Driver for Entry Cross6 189,175 
Cost Driver for Exit Cross7 176,400 
Cost Driver for Cross8 365,575 
1 Equal to the Entry revenues x (1-F) 
2 Equal to the Entry revenues x F 
3 Here equal to the product between the tariff for the consumption point (E) (here equal to 120) and the 
capacity of the consumption point 
4 Equal to the sum of the drivers for all entries (Intra-use) 
5 Equal to the sum of the Cost Driver for Entry Intra and Cost Driver for Exit Intra 
6 Equal to the sum of the drivers for all entries (Cross-use) 
7 Equal to the sum of the drivers for all exits (Cross-use) 
8 Equal to the sum of the Cost Driver for Entry Cross and Cost Driver for Exit Cross 
6.6 Reference price methodologies  
The choice of RPM is a central topic of the TAR NC and a key decision for a 
TSO/NRA. The RPM determines how to allocate the TSO’s costs among entry and 
exit points, how the TSO recovers its revenue, and how to charge network users. 
 93 
The collection of transmission services revenue must be based primarily on 
capacity charges. 
The TAR NC does not restrict the choice of RPM, since a TSO/NRA can consider 
any methodology as long as the assessment involves a comparison to the 
capacity weighted distance (CWD) reference price methodology counterfactual in 
the final consultation document. The TAR NC does not describe any possible RPM 
except for the CWD counterfactual. 
The reference price methodology:  
— Will be set / approved by NRA  
— Will be subject to the findings of the periodic consultations 
— Will provide a reference price 
— The same methodology applies to all entry and exit points in a given entry-
exit system. 
Adjustments are possible in accordance with Article 9 or as a result of: 
— benchmarking by the NRA, whereby reference prices at a given entry or exit 
point are adjusted so that the resulting values meet the competitive level of 
reference prices;  
— equalisation by the TSO(s)/NRA, whereby the same reference price is applied 
to some or all points within a homogeneous group of points;  
— rescaling by the TSO(s)/NRA, whereby the reference prices at all entry or all 
exit points, or both, are adjusted either by multiplying their values by a 
constant or by adding to or subtracting from their values a constant. 
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Figure 39. Different adjustments in use or envisaged to be used by the EU TSOs as of September 
2017 
 
The choice of the RPM shall comply with Article 13 of the Gas Regulation and with 
the following requirements: 
— to be reproducible (for the reference prices and their accurate forecast) 
— to be cost-reflective 
— to ensure non-discrimination and prevent undue cross-subsidisation  
— to be able to perform volume risk management 
— to ensure that the reference prices do not distort cross-border trade. 
Figure 40. Current entry-exit splits applied by European TSOs 
 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
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 Capacity weighted distance reference price methodology  6.6.1
Even if this methodology is not mandatory, TSOs will have to compare the tariffs 
under their RPM with the tariffs obtained using the capacity weighted distance 
(CWD) reference price methodology. 
The philosophy behind the CWD is that the share of the revenue to collect from 
each entry or exit point should be proportional to its contribution to the cost of 
the system's capacity and to the distance between it and all exit points or all 
entry points. The resulting tariff would be uniform per unit of capacity and 
distance. 
6.6.1.1 Parameters 
The parameters used as an input to the methodology are: 
— The part of revenue to be recovered from capacity-based transmission tariffs 
— The forecasted contracted capacity at each entry / exit  
— The shortest distance between an entry and an exit should be used (when 
entry and exit points can be combined in a relevant flow scenario) 
— The entry-exit split which should be 50/50. 
6.6.1.2 Steps 
The sequential steps of the methodology are: 
Computation of the weighted average distance for  
— each entry using the formula ADEn =
∑ CAPEx×DEn,Exall Ex
∑ CAPExall Ex
 
— each exit using the formula ADEx =
∑ CAPEn×DEn,Exall En
∑ CAPEnall En
 
with 
𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑛, 𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑥 the weighted average distance for entry respectively exits points 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑛, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥 the forecasted contracted capacity at entry/exit points 
𝐷𝐸𝑛,𝐸𝑥 the distance between entry/exit points 
Computation of the weight of cost for: 
— each entry using the formula Wc,En =
CAPEn×ADEn
∑ CAPEn×ADEnall En
 
— each exit using the formula Wc,Ex =
CAPEx×ADEx
∑ CAPEx×ADExall Ex
 
Identification of the part of the transmission services revenue to be recovered at 
all entries (𝑅∑ 𝐸𝑛) and all exits (𝑅∑ 𝐸𝑥) by applying the entry/exit split. 
Computation of the part of the transmission services revenue to be recovered at:  
— each entry using the formula REn = Wc,En × R∑ En 
— each exit using the formula REx = Wc,Ex × R∑ Ex 
Computation of the resulting reference price at: 
— each entry using the formula TEn =
REn
CAPEn
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— each exit using the formula TEx =
REx
CAPEx
 
 Example of application of the CWD methodology 6.6.2
We consider one fictional TSO entry/exit system with four entries and three exits 
and six pipelines, as represented in Figure 41, where a simple arrow indicates 
the flow direction, and a double one indicates that the flow is in both directions. 
The distances between the points are also indicated (in km). 
Figure 41. Simple entry/exit system for application of the CWD 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 18. Description of the system in the CWD example 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The part of the revenue to be recovered from capacity-based transmission 
tariffs: 1000€. 
Entry-exit split : 50/50. 
  
Points Type Entry Exit 
 Distances 
A IP Yes No 
AD 8.9 
B IP Yes Yes 
CD 11 
C Production Yes No 
DE 11.7 
D Storage Yes Yes 
BC 11.2 
E Consumption No Yes 
BE 9 
    
CE 13 
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Table 19. Capacity data for the system in the CWD example 
Capacity data 
 Entry points Entry technical 
capacity 
Forecasted 
contracted Entry 
IP A 20 15 
IP B 70 60 
Production C 20 20 
Storage D 8 4 
 Exit points Exit technical 
capacity 
Forecasted 
contracted Exit 
IP B 100 90 
Storage D 8 2 
Consumption E 70 70 
Table 20. Calculations in the CWD example 
Shortest pipeline path  
 Exit points  
(CAPEx) 
Entry points  
(CAPEn) B (90)  D (2) E (70)  
ADEn Sum 
prod 
Wc,En 
A (15) 29.6 8.9 20.6 25.46 936.23 40% 
B (60) 0 20.7 9 4.14  27% 
C (20) 11.2 11 13 11.98  26% 
D (4) 20.7 0 11.7 16.56  7% 
ADEx 7.58 16.12 11.67    
Sum prod 1532.01      
Wc,Ex 45% 2% 53%    
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Table 21. Results of the CWD example 
Revenue, reference price 
Entry points Wc,En Total revenue REn TEn 
A (15) 40% 500 200 13.30 
B (60) 27%   135 2.25 
C (20) 26%   130 6.50 
D (4) 7%   35 8.75 
Exit points Wc,Ex Total revenue  REx TEx 
B (90) 45% 500 225 2.50 
D (2) 2%   10 5.00 
E (70) 53%   265 3.79 
 
In this example we did not use any discount for the storage. 
 
 Adjustments of tariffs and rules for systems with more than one 6.6.3
TSO 
— A discount of at least 50 % shall be applied to capacity-based transmission 
tariffs at entry points from and exit points to storage facilities. 
— At entry points from LNG facilities and at entry points from and exit points to 
infrastructure developed with the purpose of ending the isolation of MS in 
respect of their gas transmission systems, a discount may be applied to the 
respective capacity-based transmission tariffs for the purposes of increasing 
security of supply. 
— The same RPM shall be applied jointly by all TSOs within an entry-exit system 
within a MS. 
— In order to allow for the proper application of the same RPM jointly, an 
effective inter- transmission system operator compensation mechanism shall 
be established. 
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Table 22. Current storage discounts 
MS  
TSO Entry discount  TSO Exit discount 
AT  
100%  Highly discounted 
BE  
0% 100% 
BG  
70% 70% 
CZ  
No general discount applied No general discount applied 
DE  
50% 50% 
DK  
100% 100% 
ES  
100% 100% 
FR  
85% on average 85% on average 
HR  
% 90% 
HU  
90%  100% 
IE  
No discount on capacity charge No discount on capacity charge 
IT 
14% (only if costs are allocated 
to each pipeline) 
14% (only if costs are allocated to each 
pipeline) 
NL  
25% 25% 
PL  
80% 80% 
PT  
0%  No tariffs applied 
RO  
0% 0% 
SE  
100% 100% 
SK  
0% 0% 
UK 
0% (capacity charge), 100% 
(commodity charge) 
0% (capacity charge), 100% (commodity 
charge) 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
6.7 Reserve prices 
— For yearly standard capacity products for firm capacity, the reference prices 
shall be used as reserve prices.  
— The level of multipliers and of seasonal factors and the level of discounts for 
the standard capacity products for interruptible capacity may be different at 
interconnection points.  
— Where the tariff period (see  
— Figure 36) and gas year (1 October – 30 September) do not coincide, 
separate reserve prices may be applied respectively:  
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 for the time period from 1 October to the end of the prevailing tariff period; 
and  
 for the time period from the beginning of the tariff period following the 
prevailing tariff period to 30 September.  
— The respective reserve prices shall be binding for the subsequent gas year or 
beyond it in case of fixed payable price, beginning after the annual yearly 
capacity auction, unless: 
 the discounts for monthly and daily standard capacity products for 
interruptible capacity are recalculated within the tariff period if the probability 
of interruption changes by more than twenty percent; 
 the reference price is recalculated within the tariff period due to exceptional 
circumstances under which the non-adjustment of tariff levels would 
jeopardise the operation of the TSO. 
For non-yearly standard capacity products for firm capacity, the reserve prices 
shall be calculated as set out in this Chapter. For both yearly and non-yearly 
standard capacity products for interruptible capacity, the reserve prices shall be 
calculated as set out in this Chapter. CAM NC introduces 5 standard capacity 
products: yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily, and within-day. 
Figure 42. Definitions reference and reserve prices  
 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
 Multipliers and seasonal factors  6.7.1
Rules for the multipliers and seasonal factors are given here below. 
 101 
The level of multipliers (M) will be is the following ranges:  
— for quarterly standard capacity products and for monthly standard capacity 
products, 1 ≤ 𝑀 ≤ 1.5 ; 
— for daily standard capacity products and for within-day standard capacity 
products, 1 ≤ 𝑀 ≤ 3. In duly justified cases, the level of the respective 
multipliers may be less than 1, but higher than 0, or higher than 3.  
Where seasonal factors (SF) are applied, the arithmetic mean over the gas year 
of the product of the multiplier applicable for the respective standard capacity 
product and the relevant seasonal factors shall be within the same range as for 
the level of the respective multipliers (previously defined). 
Figure 43. Application of seasonal factors in EU MS 
 
 Reserve prices for non-yearly standard capacity products for 6.7.2
firm capacity with/without seasonal factors 
The reserve prices for non-yearly standard capacity products for firm capacity 
without seasonal factors are calculated as follows: 
— For quarterly, monthly, daily products as 𝑃𝑠𝑡 =
𝑀×𝑇
365
× 𝐷 (for leap years, 365 is 
substituted with 366) 
— For within-day products as 𝑃𝑠𝑡 =
𝑀×𝑇
8760
× 𝐻 (for leap years, 8760 is substituted 
with 8784) 
With 
—  𝑃𝑠𝑡 the reserve price 
— M the level of the multiplier  
— T the reference price 
— D the duration of the standard capacity product in gas days  
— H is the duration of the within-day standard capacity product in hours.  
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Where seasonal factors are applied, the reserve prices previously calculated will 
be then multiplied by the respective seasonal factor. 
The methodology for the seasonal factors is based on the forecasted flows, 
unless the quantity of the gas flow at least for one month is equal to 0 (when it 
will be based on the forecasted contracted capacity). 
Table 23. Multipliers, seasonal factors and interruptible discounts for quarterly products at an IP 
Multiplier  
Multiplier and seasonal 
factor  
Multiplier and 
interruptible discount 
Multiplier describes 
the pricing 
relationship between 
the short-term 
product and the 
yearly product 
Seasonal factor allows for 
variations in the seasonal 
value of the same standard 
capacity products 
Although the firm price is 
the same price for a given 
‘category’ of products, 
there can be different 
interruptible prices – 
depending on factors Pro 
and A 
Quarterly – the same 
multiplier for 
Quarterly – the same 
multiplier for all four 
Quarterly – the same 
multiplier for all four 
products 
all four products 
products but different 
seasonal factors 
but different probability of 
interruption / factor ‘A’. 
- Q1 firm 1.5 Assumptions: Assumptions: 
- Q2 firm 1.5 
- Q1 and Q4 have 92 days, 
Q2 has 90 days, 
- 2 products P1 and P2 with 
‘Pro’ of 0.1 and 
- Q3 firm 1.5 Q3 has 91 days 0.25 in Q1 
- Q4 firm 1.5 - Multiplier is 1.5 
- 2 products P3 and P4 with 
‘Pro’ of 0.15 and 
  Initial values: 0.2 in Q2 
  - Q1 firm 1.5 × 1.5 
- ‘A’ factor is 1 in Q1 and 2 
in Q2, no seasonal 
  - Q2 firm 1.5 × 1.7 factor at all 
  - Q3 firm 1.5 × 0.8 
- Q1 has 92 days (d), Q2 
has 90 days 
  - Q4 firm 1.5 × 0.7 
- Reserve price (RP) for 
annual product is 365 
  Average product: - Multiplier is 1.5 
  
(1.5 × 1.5 × 92 + 1.5 × 
1.7 × 90 + 1.5 × 0.8 × 91 
+ 1.5 × 0.7 × 92) / (92 + 
90 + 91 + 92) = [1.5 (1.5 
× 92 + 1.7 × 90 + 0.8 × 
91 + 0.7 × 92)] / 365 ≈ 
1.760 Calculation of discount: 
  
Correction factor: 
1.5/1.760 
Di = Pro × A × 100 × RP × 
(d / 365) × 1.5 
  Corrected values: 
 Discount for P1 in Q1 = 10 
% × 1 × 100 % ×365 × 
(92 / 365) × 1.5 = 13.80 
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- Q1 firm 1.5 × 1.5 × (1.5 
/ 1.760) = 1.5 × 1.28 
 
 Discount for P2 in Q1 = 25 
% × 1 × 100 % ×365 × 
(92 / 365) × 1.5 = 34.50 
  
- Q2 firm 1.5 × 1.7 × (1.5 
/ 1.760) = 1.5 × 1.45 
 
 Discount for P3 in Q2 = 15 
% × 2 × 100 % × 365 × 
(90 / 365) × 1.5 = 40.50 
  
- Q3 firm 1.5 × 0.8 × (1.5 
/ 1.760) = 1.5 × 0.68 
 
 Discount for P4 in Q2 = 20 
% × 2 × 100 % ×365 × 
(90 / 365) × 1.5 = 54.00 
  
- Q4 firm 1.5 × 0.7 × (1.5 
/ 1.760) = 1.5 × 0.60   
  
After correction, average 
products falls within 
multiplier range:   
  
[1.5 (1.28 × 92 + 1.45 × 
90 + 0.68 × 91 + 0.60 × 
92)] /365 = 1.5   
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
 Reserve prices for standard capacity products for interruptible 6.7.3
capacity  
The reserve prices for standard capacity products for interruptible capacity are 
given by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑠𝑡 × (100% − 𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 is the level of an ex-ante discount: 
𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜 × 𝐴 × 100% 
and  
𝑃𝑟𝑜 =
𝑁 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝐷
×
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑎𝑣.𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑃
 
(Pro is the probability of interruption and 𝐴 ≥ 1 is an adjustment factor including 
the economic value). 
The notations used are: 
— N is the expectation of the number of interruptions over D;  
— Dint is the average duration of the expected interruptions, in hours;  
— D is the total duration of the standard capacity product for interruptible 
capacity, in hours;  
— CAPav.int is the expected average amount of interrupted capacity for each 
interruption where such amount is related to the respective type of standard 
capacity product for interruptible capacity;  
— CAP is the total amount of interruptible capacity for the respective type of 
standard capacity product for interruptible capacity.  
As an alternative to applying ex-ante discounts, the NRA may decide to apply an 
ex-post discount, whereby network users are compensated after the actual 
interruptions incurred. Such ex-post discount may only be used at 
interconnection points where there was no interruption of capacity due to 
physical congestion in the preceding gas year. The ex-post compensation paid for 
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each day on which an interruption occurred shall be equal to three times the 
reserve price for daily standard capacity products for firm capacity. 
6.8 Reconciliation of revenue 
If the TSO functions under a non-price cap regime, then 
— (the under- or over-recovery of the transmission services revenue shall be 
minimised having due regard to necessary investments;  
— the level of transmission tariffs shall ensure that the revenue is recovered by 
the TSO in a timely manner;  
— significant differences between the levels of transmission tariffs applicable for 
two consecutive tariff periods shall be avoided to the extent possible. 
If the TSO functions under a price cap regime (or applies a fixed payable price 
approach), no revenue reconciliation shall occur and all risks related to under- or 
over-recovery shall be covered exclusively by the risk premium.  
Subject to the requirements of periodic consultations, non-transmission services 
revenue may be reconciled. 
Under- and over-recovery is defined as  
RA – R, 
where RA is the actually obtained revenue related to the provision of transmission 
services and R is the transmission services revenue.  
If the difference is positive, it shall indicate an over-recovery, while if the 
difference is negative, it shall indicate an under-recovery. 
The TSO's under- or over-recovered transmission services revenue shall be 
attributed to the regulatory account. 
The full or partial reconciliation of the regulatory account shall be carried out in 
accordance with the applied RPM. The regulatory account shall be reconciled with 
the aim of reimbursing to the TSO the under-recovery and of returning to the 
network users the over-recovery. 
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Table 24. Links between revenue reconciliation, cost allocation, reference price determination and 
revenue recovery: 
 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
 
6.9 Pricing of bundled capacity and capacity at virtual 
interconnection points 
 Pricing of bundled capacity 6.9.1
The reserve price for a bundled capacity product shall be equal to the sum of the 
reserve prices for the capacities contributing to such product.  
The reserve prices for corresponding entry and exit capacities shall be made 
available when the bundled capacity product is offered and allocated by means of 
a joint booking platform. 
The revenue originating from the bundled capacity product sales corresponding 
to the reserve price for such product shall be attributed to the respective TSOs as 
follows:  
— after each transaction for a bundled capacity product;  
— in proportion to the reserve prices for the capacities contributing to such 
product.  
The auction premium originating from the bundled capacity product sales shall be 
attributed in accordance with the agreement between the respective TSOs. 
Allowed / Target Revenue Setting 
Per regulatory regime, NRAs set an 
allowed/target revenue stream which 
gives a TSO a set of allowed/target 
revenues to be earned over a defined 
period of time 
Cost Allocation 
The transmission services revenue is 
allocated to entry and exit points (or 
clusters) via RPM, which may also 
include adjustments 
Reference Price Determination 
Once the transmission services 
revenue has been allocated, cost 
drivers are considered to calculate 
the reference prices 
The reference prices are used as the 
basis for setting all capacity-based 
transmission tariffs 
Revenue Recovery 
Collection of the revenues by the 
TSOs via the application of the 
approved entry and exit tariffs 
Determination of potential revenue 
gaps that need to be reconciled in the 
following year(s) 
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 Pricing of capacity at a virtual interconnection point  6.9.2
A virtual interconnection point (VIP) is an entry and/or exit point that results 
from the aggregation of two or more IPs that connect the same two adjacent 
entry-exit systems for the purposes of providing a single capacity service. 
The reserve price for an unbundled standard capacity product offered at a VIP, 
denoted by 𝑃𝑠𝑡,𝑉𝐼𝑃 shall be calculated in accordance with either of the following 
approaches:  
— calculated on the basis of the reference price, where the applied RPM allows 
for taking into account the established VIP;  
— equal to the weighted average of the reserve prices, calculated on the basis of 
the reference prices for each IP contributing to such VIP, where the applied 
RPM does not allow for taking into account the established VIP, as: 
𝑃𝑠𝑡,𝑉𝐼𝑃 =
∑ (𝑃𝑠𝑡,𝑖 × 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖)𝑖
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑖
 
Where:  
 i is an IP contributing to the VIP 
 𝑃𝑠𝑡,𝑖 is the reserve price for a given unbundled standard capacity product at 
IPi;  
 CAPi is technical capacity or forecasted contracted capacity, at IPi.  
6.10 Clearing price and payable price 
  Calculation of clearing price at interconnection points  6.10.1
A clearing price is the price resulting from the auction. The two components that 
make up the clearing price are the reserve price and, if any, the auction 
premium. A clearing price may diverge from the payable price (56). 
The clearing price Pcl for a given standard capacity product at an IP shall be 
calculated as: 
 Pcl = PR,au + AP  
Where PR,au is the applicable reserve price for a standard capacity product and AP 
is the auction premium, if any.  
  Calculation of payable price at interconnection points  6.10.2
The payable price for a given standard capacity product at an IP shall be 
calculated in accordance with either of the following formulas:  
— where the floating payable price approach is applied:  
Pflo = PR,flo + AP  
Where: Pflo is the floating payable price; PR,flo is the reserve price for a standard 
capacity product; AP is the auction premium, if any.  
— where the fixed payable price approach is applied:  
Pfix = (PR,y × IND) + RP + AP  
                                           
(56) For the reasons of this divergence, see (51) p.107 
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Where: Pfix is the fixed payable price; PR,y is the applicable reserve price for a 
yearly standard capacity product; IND is the ratio between the chosen index at 
the time of use and the same index at the time the product was auctioned; RP 
is the risk premium reflecting the benefits of certainty regarding the level of 
transmission tariff, where such premium shall be no less than 0; AP is the 
auction premium, if any. 
  Conditions for offering payable price approaches  6.10.3
If the TSO functions under a non-price cap regime, the conditions for offering 
payable price approaches are:  
— when only existing capacity is offered:  
 the floating payable price approach shall be offered;  
 the fixed payable price approach shall not be allowed.  
— for incremental capacity and existing capacity offered in the same auction or 
same alternative allocation mechanism:  
 the floating payable price approach may be offered;  
 the fixed payable price approach may be offered if either an alternative 
allocation mechanism (as in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2017/459) is used; 
or a project is included in the Union list of projects of common interest 
If the TSO functions under a price cap regime, the floating payable price 
approach or the fixed payable price approach, or both, may be offered. 
6.11 Consultation and publication 
  Periodic consultation  6.11.1
One or more consultations shall be carried out by the NRA or the TSO(s). To the 
extent possible the consultation document should be published in the English 
language. 
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Table 25. Current responsibility for the periodic consultation 
MS Responsible for conducting 
the consultation 
 MS Responsible for conducting 
the consultation 
AT NRA  IT NRA 
BE TSO  LV To be decided 
BG TSO/NRA  LT TSO/NRA 
CZ NRA  NL NRA 
HR To be decided  PL TSO 
DK TSO/NRA  PT NRA 
FI NRA  RO NRA 
FR NRA  SK TSO 
DE NRA  SI To be decided 
GR NRA  ES NRA 
HU NRA  SE To be decided 
IE TSO/NRA  UK TSO 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
The final consultation shall include the following information:  
1. the description of the proposed RPM as well as:  
 the justification and the values of the parameters used that are related to the 
technical characteristics of the system;  
 the value of the proposed adjustments for capacity-based transmission 
tariffs;  
 the indicative reference prices subject to consultation;  
 the results, the components and the details of these components for the cost 
allocation assessments; 
 the assessment of the proposed RMP;  
 if the proposed RPM is other than the CWD, its comparison against the latter; 
2. technical characteristics of the transmission system; 
3. information on transmission and non-transmission tariffs:  
 where commodity-based transmission tariffs are proposed: (1) the manner in 
which they are set; (2) the share of the allowed or target revenue forecasted 
to be recovered from such tariffs; (3) the indicative commodity-based 
transmission tariffs;  
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 where non-transmission services provided to network users are proposed: 
(1) the non-transmission service tariff methodology therefor; (2) the share of 
the allowed or target revenue forecasted to be recovered from such tariffs; 
(3) the manner in which the associated non-transmission services revenue is 
reconciled as referred to in Article 17(3); (4) the indicative non-transmission 
tariffs for non-transmission services provided to network users;  
4. if the fixed payable price approach is considered to be offered under a price 
cap regime for existing capacity:  
 the proposed index;  
 the proposed calculation and how the revenue derived from the risk premium 
is used;  
 at which IP(s) and for which tariff period(s) such approach is proposed;  
 the process of offering capacity at an interconnection point where both fixed 
and floating payable price approaches referred to in Article 24 are proposed. 
The final consultation shall be open for at least two months.  
Within one month following the end of the consultation, the TSO(s) or the NRA 
shall publish the consultation responses received and their summary. The 
summary should be provided in the English language (to the extent possible). 
  Periodic national regulatory authority decision-making 6.11.2
The consultation documents will be forwarded to ACER, which shall analyse some 
of the aspects of the consultation document. Within two months following the 
end of the consultation, ACER shall publish and send to the NRA/TSO and the 
Commission the conclusion of its analysis, in English. ACER shall preserve the 
confidentiality of any commercially sensitive information.  
Within five months following the end of the final consultation, the NRA shall take 
and publish a motivated decision on all items described in 6.11.1, and shall send 
it to ACER and the Commission. 
The procedure consisting of the final consultation on the RPM, the 
calculation/publication of tariffs on the basis of this decision may be initiated as 
from the entry into force of this Regulation and shall be concluded no later than 
31 May 2019.  
  Consultation on discounts, multipliers and seasonal factors 6.11.3
At the same time as the final consultation previously mentioned, the NRA shall 
conduct a consultation with the NRAs of all directly connected MS and the 
relevant stakeholders on:  
— the level of multipliers;  
— if applicable, the level of seasonal factors;  
— the levels of discounts. 
After the end of the consultation a motivated decision shall be taken and each 
NRA shall consider the positions of NRAs of directly connected MS. 
When adopting the decision, the NRA shall take into account the consultation 
responses received and the following aspects:  
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— for multipliers:  
 the balance between facilitating short-term gas trade and providing long-
term signals for efficient investment in the transmission system;  
 the impact on the transmission services revenue and its recovery;  
 the need to avoid cross-subsidisation between network users and to enhance 
cost-reflectivity of reserve prices;  
 situations of physical and contractual congestion;  
 the impact on cross-border flows;  
— for seasonal factors:  
 the impact on facilitating the economic and efficient utilisation of the 
infrastructure;  
 the need to improve the cost-reflectivity of reserve prices. 
Figure 44. Final consultation timeline 
 
Source: ENTSOG (51) 
  Information to be published before the annual yearly capacity 6.11.4
auction  
For IPs and, where the NRA takes a decision to apply the CAM NC Regulation, 
points other than IPs, the following information shall be published before the 
annual yearly capacity auction:  
— for standard capacity products for firm capacity:  
 the reserve prices applicable until at least the end of the gas year beginning 
after the annual yearly capacity auction;  
 the multipliers and seasonal factors applied to reserve prices for non-yearly 
standard capacity products;  
 the justification of the NRA for the level of multipliers;  
 where seasonal factors are applied, the justification for their application.  
— for standard capacity products for interruptible capacity:  
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 the reserve prices applicable until at least the end of the gas year beginning 
after the annual yearly capacity auction;  
 an assessment of the probability of interruption including:  
 the list of all types of standard capacity products for interruptible capacity 
offered including the respective probability of interruption and the level of 
discount applied;  
 the explanation of how the probability of interruption is calculated for each 
type of product;  
 the historical or forecasted data, or both, used for the estimation of the 
probability of interruption. 
  Information to be published before the tariff period  6.11.5
The following information shall be published before the tariff period by the 
NRA/TSO(s):  
— technical capacity at entry and exit points and associated assumptions;  
— forecasted contracted capacity at entry and exit points and associated 
assumptions; 
— the quantity and the direction of the gas flow for entry and exit points and 
associated assumptions, such as demand and supply scenarios for the gas 
flow under peak conditions;  
— the structural representation of the transmission network with an appropriate 
level of detail;  
— additional technical information about the transmission network, such as the 
length and the diameter of pipelines and the power of compressor stations; 
— the allowed or target revenue, or both, of the TSO;  
— the information related to changes in the revenue from one year to the next 
year;  
— the following parameters:  
 types of assets included in the regulated asset base and their aggregated 
value;  
 cost of capital and its calculation methodology;  
 capital expenditures, including:  
 methodologies to determine the initial value of the assets;  
 methodologies to re-evaluate the assets;  
 explanations of the evolution of the value of the assets;  
 depreciation periods and amounts per asset type.  
 operational expenditures; 
 incentive mechanisms and efficiency targets;  
 inflation indices.  
 the transmission services revenue;  
 the following ratios for the revenue:  
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 capacity-commodity split, meaning the breakdown between the 
revenue from capacity-based transmission tariffs and the revenue from 
commodity-based transmission tariffs;  
 entry-exit split, meaning the breakdown between the revenue from 
capacity-based transmission tariffs at all entry points and the revenue 
from capacity-based transmission tariffs at all exit points;  
 intra-system/cross-system split, meaning the breakdown between the 
revenue from intra-system network use at both entry points and exit 
points and the revenue from cross-system network use at both entry 
points and exit points; 
 if the TSO functions under a non-price cap regime, the following information 
related to the previous tariff period on regarding the reconciliation of the 
regulatory account:  
 the actually obtained revenue, the under- or over-recovery of the allowed 
revenue and the part attributed to the regulatory account;  
 the reconciliation period and the incentive mechanisms implemented.  
 the intended use of the auction premium.  
 where applied, commodity-based transmission tariffs;  
 where applied, non-transmission tariffs for non-transmission services;  
 the reference prices and other prices applicable at points. 
 the difference in the level of transmission tariffs for the same type of 
transmission service applicable for the prevailing tariff period and for the 
tariff period for which the information is published;  
 the estimated difference in the level of transmission tariffs for the same type 
of transmission service applicable for the tariff period for which the 
information is published and for each tariff period within the remainder of the 
regulatory period; 
 at least a simplified tariff model, updated regularly, accompanied by the 
explanation of how to use it, enabling network users to calculate the 
transmission tariffs applicable for the prevailing tariff period and to estimate 
their possible evolution beyond such tariff period. 
  Form and period of publication  6.11.6
The previous information shall be published on ENTSOG's Transparency Platform 
(https://transparency.entsog.eu/). It shall be accessible to the public, free of 
charge and of any limitations as to its use.  
It shall be published:  
— in a user-friendly manner;  
— in a clear, easily accessible way and on a non-discriminatory basis;  
— in a downloadable format;  
— in one or more of the official languages of the MS and, unless one of the 
official languages of the MS is English, to the extent possible, in English.  
The deadline for the publication is 
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— no later than thirty days before the annual yearly capacity auction for the 
information to be published before the annual yearly capacity auction; 
— for the information to be published before the tariff period, no later than 
thirty days before the respective tariff period;  
— for the respective transmission tariffs updated within the tariff period, 
immediately after the approval.  
Each update of the transmission tariffs shall be accompanied by information 
indicating the reasons for the changes in their level.  
6.12 Incremental capacity 
The minimum price at which TSO shall accept a request for incremental capacity 
is the reference price.  
For the calculation of the economic test, reference prices shall be derived by 
including into the RPM the relevant assumptions related to the offer of 
incremental capacity. 
Where the fixed payable price approach is considered to be offered for 
incremental capacity, the reserve price shall be based on projected investment 
and operating costs. Once the incremental capacity is commissioned, such 
reserve price shall be adjusted proportionally to the difference, irrespective 
whether positive or negative, between the projected investment costs and the 
actual investment costs.  
In case the allocation of all incremental capacity at the reference price would not 
generate sufficient revenues for a positive economic test outcome, a mandatory 
minimum premium may be applied in the first auction or alternative allocation 
mechanism in which the incremental capacity is offered. The mandatory 
minimum premium may also be applied in subsequent auctions when the 
capacity is offered that initially remained unsold or when capacity is offered that 
was initially set aside. 
The level of the mandatory minimum premium shall enable a positive economic 
test outcome with the revenues generated by the offered capacity in the first 
auction or alternative allocation mechanism in which the incremental capacity is 
on offer. The range of the level for the mandatory minimum premium shall be 
submitted to the relevant NRAs for approval. 
A mandatory minimum premium approved by the NRA shall be added to the 
reference price for the bundled capacity products at the respective IP and shall 
exclusively be attributed to the TSOs for which the mandatory minimum 
premium was approved. This default principle for the attribution of a mandatory 
minimum premium is without prejudice to the split of a possible additional 
auction premium or an alternative agreement between the involved national 
regulatory authorities. 
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